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DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
VOLUME 19, ARTICLE 19, PAGES 665-704
PUBLISHED 01 JULY 2008
http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/19/
DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.19
Research Article
Italy:
Delayed adaptation of social institutions
to changes in family behaviour
Alessandra De Rose
Filomena Racioppi
Anna Laura Zanatta
This publication is part of Special Collection 7: Childbearing Trends and
Policies in Europe (http://www.demographic-research.org/special/7/)
© 2008 De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta.
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use, reproduction & distribution in any medium
for non-commercial purposes, provided the original author(s) and source are given credit.
See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 666
2 A profile of low fertility 670
3 The proximate determinants of fertility 676
4 Explaining low fertility in Italy: micro and macro determinants 679
5 Societal conditions impacting fertility and family 682
5.1 Lack of labour market flexibility 683
5.2 An unbalanced gender system 687
5.3 The ‘delay syndrome’ 689
5.4 Too much family 690
5.5 Too much Church and too little religiosity 691
6 Family policies 692
6.1 Financial support 693
6.1.1 Indirect financial support 693
6.1.2 Direct financial support 693
6.2 Social policies favourable to work-family reconciliation 694
6.2.1 Maternal leave 694
6.2.2 Parental leave 694
6.3 Flexibility of the labour market 694
6.4 Child care services 694
6.5 Policies of the present and recent past concerning
population and family
695
6.6 A short overview of the major political parties’ position on
fertility issues and policies
696
6.6.1 To reconcile work with personal and family life 698
6.6.2 Educational services for children and families 698
6.6.3 Investing in the future: an allowance for each child, a deposit
account for each young boy or girl
698
6.6.4 Solving the housing problem 699
7 Conclusion 699
References 701
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research article
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Italy:
Delayed adaptation of social institutions
to changes in family behaviour
Alessandra De Rose
1
Filomena Racioppi
2
Anna Laura Zanatta
3
Abstract
Considering its very low fertility and high age at childbearing, Italy stands alone in the
European context and can hardly be compared with other countries, even those in the
Southern region. The fertility decline occurred without any radical change in family
formation. Individuals still choose (religious) marriage for leaving their parental home
and rates of marital dissolution and subsequent step-family formation are low. Marriage
is being postponed and fewer people marry. The behaviours of young people are
particularly alarming. There is a delay in all life cycle stages: end of education, entry
into the labour market, exit from the parental family, entry into union, and managing an
independent household. Changes in family formation and childbearing are constrained
and slowed down by a substantial delay (or even failure) with which the institutional
and cultural framework has adapted to changes in economic and social conditions, in
particular to the growth of the service sector, the increase in female employment and
the female level of education. In a Catholic country that has been led for almost half a
century by a political party with a Catholic ideology, the paucity of attention to
childhood and youth seems incomprehensible. Social policies focus on marriage-based
families already formed and on the phases of life related to pregnancy, delivery, and the
first months of a newborn’s life, while forming a family and childbearing choices are
considered private affairs and neglected.
1
Sapienza Universita' di Roma. E-mail: alessandra.derose@uniroma1.it
2
Sapienza Universita' di Roma. E-mail: filome[email protected]
3
Sapienza Universita' di Roma. E-mail: annalaura.zanatta@uniroma1.it
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
666 http://www.demographic-research.org
1. Introduction
The Italian demographic panorama is dominated by very low fertility, very high levels
of life expectation, a negative sign of natural increase, and a positive balance between
immigrants and emigrants, with persistent regional variability (Table 1). These features
contribute to transforming the traditional image of Italian society, characterised by large
families, a high attachment to childbearing, with a long experience of emigration
toward richer and more industrialized countries.
Table 1: Recent demographic indicators by geographic area, Italy, 2005
Period TFR
(2004)
e
0
M
e
0
F
Birth rate
(x1000 in.)
Mortality rate
(x1000 in.)
Natural
balance
(a)
Migration
balance
(b)
Italy 1.33
77.6
83.2
9.7
9.8
-0.1
5.2
North 1.32
77.7
83.5
9.6
10.2
-0.6
8.3
Centre 1.28
78.1
83.5
9.4
10.4
-1.0
7.9
South-
Islands
1.35
77.2
82.7
10.1
9.0
1.1
0.1
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
a Birth rate – Mortality rate.
b [(Total Immigrants- Total Emigrants)/Total Pop,]*1000.
Indeed, ‘zero population growth’ considered desirable by many political parties
after the Second World War is now a reality. Only thanks to a positive migration
balance Italy’s population is not yet decreasing. If we compare the total population of
1990 with that of 1 January 2005 (Table 2), we conclude that not much has changed.
However, the composition of the population has changed entirely in terms of age and
sex, and the proportion of the aged population has recently exceeded that of young
people. Projections for the near future forecast a decline in the Italian population: Even
though a recovery in fertility is hypothesized, a population decrease will be observed as
well as an increase in aging (Figure 1).
These prospects are valid, despite the expectation of a net annual addition of
120,000 migrants. The phenomenon of immigration to Italy, though relatively recent,
has now become crucial for the future of the population. According to official data
4
(Caritas /Migrantes 2006), 3,035,144 foreigners lived in Italy on 31
December 2005,
constituting an increase of 9% compared to the previous year, and a 126% increase
4
Official data refer to an estimation on the basis of resident population by ISTAT and other information from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior Affairs.
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compared to 2000. The foreign population represents 5.2% of the total population, but
the whole impact of migrants on Italian demography is difficult to assess, mainly
because the life span spent in our country by most foreigners has been relatively brief.
Table 2: Population size and structure indicators, 1990-2005
Population structure (%)
Population
size
(thousands)
0–14
15–64
65 and
over
Aging ratio
(P
65+
/P
0
-
14
)*100
Annual
growth rate
1990–2005
1,1,1990 56,719
16.8
68.5
14.7
87.6 -
1,1,2005 (a) 58,093 14.2
66.4
19.5
137.7 1.6 x 1000
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
(a) estimates.
No more than 50,000 foreigners have lived in Italy for more than 10 years.
Nevertheless, we will speculate on the impact of migration on the population structure,
which is rejuvenated by foreigners who are relatively young (Figure 2), and its impact
on the number of births. Figure 3 shows a strong increase in the share of births due to
foreign (resident) population on the total number of births (8.7% in 2004). However, the
impact on the Italian fertility level appears insignificant: In 2004, the PTFR – calculated
on the total resident population – was 1.33, while that of Italian citizens only was 1.26.
At the same time caution is suggested while looking for the effect of migration on
fertility, for different reasons. First, we expect foreign women and couples, even those
from high fertility countries, to change their childbearing behaviour to that of the Italian
model. Second, the first reason for immigration is the search for employment, even
among women, and it is hard to reconcile this attitude with childbearing. Third, thus far
the relative size of the foreign population is not large enough to produce appreciable
effects on total fertility. Fourth, the ethnic composition is very heterogeneous, i.e.,
consisting of many different nationalities and distinctive cultural and religious groups
with different social and demographic structures and norms of behaviour, all of them
living in the same country. As we look at estimated fertility indicators by nationality
(Table 3), we notice, e.g., that while the mean age at childbearing among foreigners is
lower than 30, regardless of the country of origin (the only exception being Peruvian
women), the fertility levels differ very much among nationalities, and in some cases –
e.g., the Philippines and Peruvian – are close to the Italian level.
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
668 http://www.demographic-research.org
Figure 1: Italian population (in thousands) and percentage of people
aged 60+by projection scenario, 1950-2050
40.000
42.000
44.000
46.000
48.000
50.000
52.000
54.000
56.000
58.000
60.000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Years
Thousands
Low
Medium
High
% 60+
Low
25
.
6
29
.
9
36
.
0
43
.
4
46
.
7
Medium
25
.
6
29
.
3
34
.
4
40
.
3
41
.
7
High
25
.
6
28
.
8
32
.
9
37
.
6
37
.
3
Source: ONU, 2005.
Note: Low variant: recovery of fertility to 1,35 through the years 2040-45,
Medium variant: recovery of fertility to 1,85 through the years 2040-45,
High variant: recovery of fertility to 2,35 through the years 2040-45,
Net flow of 120,000 immigrants per year is hypothesized.
For the time being, trends in childbearing, even the most recent, have to be
explained within the framework of the Italian population and society, with its culture,
institutional, and economic structures, and the ambiguous net of relationships between
family and the Welfare State. In the rest of the paper, we aim to illustrate at least the
main aspects related to low fertility in Italy, starting with a detailed description of
recent childbearing trends.
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Figure 2: Age structure of Italian population, including foreigners,
1 January 2005
600.000 500.000 400.000 300.000 200.000 100.000 0 100.000 200.000 300.000 400.000 500.000 600.000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
10
men
women
foreign
foreign
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
Figure 3: Percentage of foreigners out of total resident population
and out of total births
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Percent
Year
Resident population
Births
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
670 http://www.demographic-research.org
Table 3: Fertility of foreign women, ten most represented countries
of citizenship, 1999
Country of
citizenship
% of
female population
(age 15-49 out of a
total of 10 countries
Mean age at
childbearing
TFR observed in
Italy (a)
TFR observed in the
country of origin (b)
Morocco 19.9 27.5 3.4 3.4
Philippines 17.5 28.9 1.2 3.6
Albania 16.1 25.7 2.7 2.6
Romania 8.7 27.0 1.6 1.3
China 8.5 28.1 2.4 1.8
Peru 7.6 30.2 1.2 3.0
Poland 7.1 26.9 1.8 1.5
Tunisia 5.6 26.5 3.3 2.3
Brazil 5.5 27.1 1.6 2.3
Egypt 3.4 27.0 3.4 3.4
Source: ISTAT,Annual Report 2002.
(a) Estimated.
(b) ONU,1995-2000.
2. A profile of low fertility
The decline of fertility is depicted in Figure 4. The Period Total Fertility Rate (PTFR)
fell below 2 children per woman in 1977, below 1.5 in 1984, and below 1.3 in 1993. In
the following decade, the PTFR was relatively stable around 1.25. It is only in very
recent years that we notice a slight increase in the level, which is, however, hardly
interpretable as a convincing sign of recovery in childbearing, mainly if we read these
data together with the continuous drop in completed fertility of female cohorts, from
2.28 children per woman in the 1935 cohort to 1.49 for the 1965 cohort.
The main features of this decline can be summarized as follows: first, a steady
decrease in the propensity to have a third or higher-order child and a more recent
declining propensity to have a second child; and second, the progressive delay in timing
fertility, starting with the postponement of first childbirth, accelerating the decrease in
period fertility levels.
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Figure 4: Period (PTFR) and cohort (CTFR) total fertility rate, Italy
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985
CTFR
PTFR
Cohort
Period1933 1943 1953
1963
1973
1983
1993 2003 2013
Source: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
Figure 5 shows the dramatic decrease of third and higher-order total fertility rates,
but also a change in second-order fertility intensity due to cohorts of the 1950s and
younger cohorts. The youngest female generation of reproductive age even began to
refrain from having a first child. Indeed, the percentage of childless women is
increasing: For the 1945 birth cohort, it stood at a mere 10.2% while it reached 20% in
the 1965 birth cohort. As a result, the distribution of women by number of children born
has changed significantly (Figure 6): Women born between 1930 and 1950 experienced
a decline in childlessness and an affirmation of the two-child-family-model. This model
is progressively becoming less attractive for subsequent cohorts. In the 1960 cohort,
women with two children (37.2%) are outnumbered by the sum of mothers of an only
child (20.5%) and of childless women (24.2%); the figure for large families - namely
those with three or more children – stands at a mere 18.1%.
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672 http://www.demographic-research.org
Figure 5: TFR by order and cohort
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964
Cohort
TFR by order
1° order 2° order 3° order 4°+ orders
Source:
Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
Figure 6: Distribution of women by number of children ever born (%),
1930-60 cohorts
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960
Percent
0 1 2 3+
Source:
Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
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Figures of childbearing intensity have to be read together with the delay in the
timing of fertility that we have been observing since the 1955 birth cohort (Figure 7). In
the female cohorts born in the late 1960s, the mean age at first childbirth is almost 27
and the proportion of women with a first child before age 25 is declining with
subsequent birth cohorts owing to a sharp decline in early-age specific fertility rates by
cohort. Figure 8 clearly shows the decline in the level of fertility rates at ages 20 and
25. A steady progress of childbearing postponement is evident among the cohorts of the
mid-1950s and of the 1960s. Figure 9 depicts the differences in cumulated cohort
fertility, separately for first birth and second-order births, between women born in the
years 1960–1980 and women of the 1950 reference cohort. At age 30, Italian women
born in 1965 had on average .20 fewer first and second-order children than the 1950
cohort. The difference in fertility level with respect to the reference cohort widens for
younger women. At age 25, Italian women born in 1970 had .33 fewer first children,
and it is likely that this difference further widened as the cohort reached its late 20s.
The graphs also reveal the extent to which differences in fertility levels across cohorts
are due to fertility postponement (Billari and Kohler 2002). The Italian 1960 cohort
‘lagged’ behind the 1950 reference cohort and had on average about .13 fewer first
births at age 26. When this cohort reached the late 20s and early 30s, however, the gap
narrowed and fertility for first births partially recuperated; a similar pattern is observed
for second-order fertility.
Figure 7: Mean age at first child by birth cohort
23.5
24.0
24.5
25.0
25.5
26.0
26.5
27.0
1933 1937 1941 1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965
Source
: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
674 http://www.demographic-research.org
Figure 8: Age-specific fertility rates by cohort, 1940 –1980
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Female birth cohort
Rates
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Source:
Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
The recovery in fertility after age 30 among cohorts born since the end of the
1960s helps to explain the slight increase in period fertility recently observed and also
suggests that a ‘new’ behaviour is emerging, characterised by childbearing
postponement and recuperation. In the near future, we do expect fertility to remain
under the replacement level. In addition, it will be very important to understand the
behaviours and intentions of the younger generations, namely those born in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Apparently their fertility is no longer declining compared to the
1975 cohort. They are succeeding in having at least one child and possibly two (Rosina
2004).
A further aspect that should be mentioned with regard to the alarming trends and
features of Italian fertility is its geographical heterogeneity. Differences in the level and
timing of fertility still exist among regions. In the Centre and in the North there are
higher levels of childlessness, more one-child families, and the highest mean age at
childbearing, but a certain stability in trends. In the South, there is a prevalence of two-
child families and a relatively higher proportion of numerous families (Barbagli et al.
2003). However, a deep convergence in fertility levels between the regions can be
observed in recent years (Figure 10). One can argue that the fast decline of the total
fertility level in the South will result in a further decline in fertility at the national level.
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This is because the higher fertility in the South has, up to now, been ‘propping up’ the
national fertility.
Figure 9: Cumulated fertility by birth cohort
Comulative change in first birth progression rate by age and birth cohort
-400
-350
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Comulative change in second birth progression rate by age and birth cohort
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Source
: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
676 http://www.demographic-research.org
Figure 10: PTFR by geographic area , Italy, 1980-2004
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Italy
North
Centre
South-Islands
Source
: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
3. The proximate determinants of fertility
The decline of fertility has occurred without any radical change in family formation.
The majority of households are still formed by (married) couples with or without
children. Any other forms of ‘modern’ living arrangements were practically nonexistent
until the early 1990s due to the slow diffusion of informal unions, marital dissolution,
and subsequent step-family formation. Some incipient signs of change in household
distribution by typology can be observed in the very last decade (Table 4): The
percentage of childless singles and couples is increasing - also due, importantly, to
population ageing - as well as the share of informal unions of the total number of
couples and the percentage of step families after divorce. The most important change,
however, is the decline of marriage (Table 5). The number of marriages reached its
lowest level in 2003 (4.5 marriages per 1000 inhabitants). The first marriage rate per
1000 women younger than 50 years of age decreased from 1000 in 1961 to 580 in 2001,
while the mean age at first marriage reached 27.0 at the end of the 1990s. An interesting
trend is that the percentage of marriages celebrated by civil rite, quite insignificant until
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the early 1970s, reached the value of 28.7% in 2003. The delay in marriage is related to
the behaviour of recent cohorts, and this is affected by delayed leaving of the parental
home and the consequent higher age at marriage compared to earlier generations
(Figure 11): The median age of leaving the parental home and that of marriage has been
increasing ever since the 1954-58 birth cohort, both for males and females.
Table 4: Households in Italy, 1994-2003
year Single
With 5
members
or more
Extended
households
Couples
with
children
C
ouples
w
ithout
children
Lone
mothers/
fathers
Informal
un
ions (out of
100 couples)
Step
Families
1994
–
1995 21.1 8.4 5.1 62.4
26.
7
10.9 1.8 4.1
1996
–
1997
20.8 7.9 5.3 61.2
27.
8
11.0 2.0 3.5
1998
–
1999
22.2 7.7 5.5 60.8
28.
1
11.1 2.4 3.9
2000
–
2001
23.9 7.1 5.1 60.2
27.
8
12.0 3.1 4.3
2002
–
2003
25.3 6.8 5.3 58.9
29.
2
11.9 3.9 4.8
Source
: Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
Table 5: Marriage indicators, Italy, 1961-2003
Year Number
Per 1000
inhabitants
% by
civil rite
First Marriage Rate
(women <50)
Mean age at female
first marriage
1961 397461 7.9 1.6 1000 24.7
1971 404464 7.5 3.9 1003 23.9
1981 316953 5.6 12.7 760 23.8
1991 312061 5.5 17.5 670 25.7
1993 302230 5.3 17.9 660 26.0
1995 290009 5.1 20.0 630 26.6
1997 277738 4.8 20.7 600 27.0
1999 280330 4.9 23.0 600 27.0
2001 264026 4.6 27.1 580
2003 257880 4.5 28.7
Source:
Our elaborations of ISTAT data.
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
678 http://www.demographic-research.org
Figure 11: Median age at leaving parental home and marriage
by gender and cohorts
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
1944-48 1949-53 1954-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-73
leaving home M
leaving home F
First marriage M
First marriage F
Source:
Barbagli et al, 2003.
Uncompleted Second Demographic Transition has been recalled as one of the
reasons why fertility is so low in Italy compared to Central and Northern European
countries, namely because non-marital fertility has not replaced the decline and delay in
marital fertility (De Sandre 2000). Although increasing, the share of births out of
wedlock is not higher than 14% and the great majority of children are still born to
married couples.
It can be argued that the Second Contraceptive Revolution (Leridon 1987) has yet
to take effect in Italy, which is another puzzling feature of the Italian paradox in family
behaviours. The very low fertility level has been reached by means of theoretically low-
effective contraceptive devices (Table 6). Until the end of the 1970s, 58% of married
women aged 18-44 relied on the method of coitus interruptus; in 1996 the same was
true for 34% of married women and 12% of singles, and, while the younger cohorts
increasingly rely on modern contraception, male-coitus-related methods - namely the
use of condoms and withdrawal - are still more popular than the pill, especially among
married and cohabitant couples (Dalla Zuanna et al. 2005). Notwithstanding, the
number of induced abortions, which was relatively high at the beginning of the fertility
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transition, reaching 200,000 per year at the end of the 1970s, steadily declined in the
following 20 years, between 1983 and 2003 falling from 17.2 to 9.6 per 1000 married
women aged 15-49. In this period, all age-specific abortion rates declined, with the
exception of the fertility rate of women younger than 20 years of age, which is
relatively stable around 5-6%. In 2004, however, the gross rate of abortion slightly
increased (9.9 abortions per 1000 women at ages 15-49) mainly due to the foreign
immigrant population, which, on the whole, shows an abortion rate equal to 35.5 per
1000 (ISTAT 2006).
To conclude, instead of being responsible for the decline of fertility, Italian birth
control behaviour can be viewed as resulting from a lack of modernity, which, as we
discuss in the following sections, is viewed as a main cause of the current depressed
childbearing level.
Table 6: Women (%) by contraceptive method used (1979–1996)
Natural
methods Withdrawal Condom IUD Pill Others Total
Women’s
age
N, of
women
1979 married 9 58 13 4 13 3 100 18-44 4,493
1996 couples 6 34 25 9 24 2 100 20-49 1,750
1996 singles 2 12 32 3 51 1 100 20-49 558
Source:
Dalla Zuanna et al, 2005.
4. Explaining low fertility in Italy: micro and macro determinants
The determinants of fertility decline in Italy have been explored thoroughly (Ongaro
2002; Salvini 2004) and can easily be reconciled with the socio-economic and cultural
changes that occurred in Western industrialized countries after the Second World War.
Economic approaches
5
(Bernhardt 1993) as well as the cultural explanations
6
(Van de
Kaa 1987) are consistent with the empirical analysis of the individual life histories of
Italian women. In a recent paper (Kertzer et al. 2006), a comprehensive overview of the
most prominent explanations of low fertility in Italy and an analysis of panel
longitudinal survey data have been presented as parts of a project on Explaining Low
Fertility in Italy. The individual data analysis of the transition to first and second child
5
Economic approaches focus on increased female autonomy, the entry of an increasing number of women
into the labour force, and calculations of the direct and indirect costs of childbearing (Bernhardt 1993).
6
Cultural explanations, namely the diffusion of individualism and secularization, have been incorporated into
the Second Demographic Transition theory for a better understanding of the persistent decline of fertility and
its relationship with family changes (Van de Kaa 1987)
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
680 http://www.demographic-research.org
largely confirms that both the main factors chosen -- the economic approach (woman’s
labour-force participation) and the secularization one (married in a civil union) -- play a
significant and strong role in delaying or even discouraging women to have a (further)
child, with all the other characteristics controlled for. Also, the predictive meaning of
these two factors does not prevent the regional and cohort effects being meaningful.
Younger cohorts, namely women born between 1961 and 1970, have lower rates of
transition to a first and second child compared to earlier generations. Women living in
the South of Italy, i.e., those regions with a lower rate of female labour-force
participation and a lower percentage of civil marriages out of total unions, show a
higher risk of having children and shorter birth intervals than their counterparts of
Central Italy and the country’s North.
Once the two levels of observation – individuals and residential units – have been
integrated into a proper multilevel modelling framework (Bernardi and Gabrielli 2006),
the role played by women’s work and religiosity is confirmed at both levels: Being in a
religious marriage increases a woman’s propensity to enter motherhood and to have a
second birth earlier, while being employed depresses both transitions. The inclusion of
the contextual level variables does not modify the effect of individual characteristics,
but the regional random effects are statistically significant, indicating that the intercept
of the individual model varies over contexts. Also contextual factors have a significant
effect, though they impact on the timing of second birth and on first birth in different
ways: Living in a suburban or a non-urban area increases the probability to become a
parent but it has no effect on the second child; living in an area where female
employment is common considerably depresses the likelihood to become a mother and
to have a second child earlier. The level of religiosity has no effect on first birth, while
time-to-second-child is significantly shortened in contexts where attending Catholic
Mass is more widespread.
These results are in line with a previous multilevel analysis on total expected
fertility of Italian women aged 20-49 in the mid-1990s (Borra et al. 1999) based on a set
of micro variables (age, marital status, education, the number of siblings, employment
status of both partners, religious attendance, type of union) and three macro indicators
derived from a synthesis of macro variables through a principal components analysis
(1
st
component: degree of economic and social development, labelled as
‘modernisation’, 2
nd
: level of urbanisation, 3
rd
: secularisation). The individual variables’
effects were as expected. But much more interesting was the possibility to see the
contextual effects at the municipality level. As usual, those in the southern regions
(along with some regions of the North-East, such as Friuli Venezia Giulia) have a
context that raises fertility. The opposite applies to the northwest, some central regions
and in Sardinia.
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However, these results do not help to explain the striking contradiction in the
relationship between very recent childbearing trends and macro-economic and cultural
differences observable at the regional level. Since one of the most notable features of
recent trends in Italian fertility is a tendency toward convergence of fertility rates
between the North and the South, this is not accompanied by any convergence in
women activity rates and in the spread of secularized behaviours. In a more detailed
analysis, some regional specificities emerge, such as the case of Basilicata, situated in
the South: In 2003, the total fertility rate stood at 1.20, i.e., it was below the national
average, but the female labour-force participation rate was among the lowest in Italy,
with only 46% of women aged 25-34 in the labour force, and only 9% of marriages
celebrated outside church (Kertzel et al. 2006).
Even more difficult to reconcile are results observed at the micro level as well as
the national lowest low level of fertility and low female labour-force participation rate
with the perception of Italy as one of the most traditional, Catholic, and family-oriented
countries among the Western societies.
Several studies have aimed to understand and to explain the particular position of
Italy in comparison to other European countries. De Rose and Racioppi (2001) found
that the analysis of the individual determinants of Voluntary Low Fertility (VLF: choice
of having 0 or 1 child at most) benefits integration with contextual conditions
influencing individual choices and the decision-making process. Women with
homogenous individual and family characteristics have different fertility expectations
based on their country of origin, just because their respective countries differ
demographically, socially, economically or culturally, as well as in terms of their
gender system. VLF decreases in those contexts where the welfare state is more
supportive to women and families and where there is a more balanced gender system.
Moreover, with a focus on Southern Europe, we compared Italy, Spain, Greece,
and Portugal, using a multivariate approach (De Rose and Racioppi 2004). The four
countries are similar in many respects – they have reached the lowest level of fertility
worldwide within a very short time; the marriage rates have decreased, divorces and
cohabitations are not yet common, but there are differences in socio-economic
indicators. From this analysis we conclude that Southern Europe has a homogeneous
demographic system but is relatively heterogeneous with regard to other societal
characteristics. Yet, the closeness between Italy and Spain with respect to socio-
economic and cultural variables that affect sexual, family, and reproductive behaviours
(e.g., the strong association between age at first sexual intercourse and religious
attendance) becomes clear.
As an important source of variability among countries, the different level of
institutional support to family and fertility is usually examined. Accordingly, fertility is
expected to be higher in those countries where the government offers programs that
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
682 http://www.demographic-research.org
make women’s work and childbearing more compatible (Rindfuss et al. 2003). Again,
the case of Italy appears as contradictory. The provision of publicly funded childcare,
maternity leave, and tax benefits are all better in Italy than what is available in the USA
or UK, yet there the level of fertility is significantly higher. Not surprisingly,
Engelhardt and Prskawetz (2004), looking at trends in OECD countries over time,
conclude: “Trends in the variables that would be representative for the role
incompatibility hypothesis and the ease in combining work and child-rearing…cannot
be related to the trends in fertility.”
In conclusion, all of these factors, though playing an important role in the
explanation of the decline in Italian fertility, are not sufficient to understand its
persistence at such a low level. Many scholars are exploring different paths of research
that, on the whole, support the fundamental idea that the peculiar interaction between
economic and structural changes and the nature of family ties in Italy leads to a
different development of fertility and household dynamics with respect to those
included in the Second Demographic Transition (Billari and Wilson 2001; Micheli
2004). In the following, we argue that the substantial delay (or even failure) with which
society has adapted to changes in individual attitudes and behaviours and in the quality
of the relationships between genders and among generations is forcing men and women
toward a very low fertility level.
5. Societal conditions impacting fertility and family
What is peculiar in Italy is the speed with which post-war social and economic changes
have taken place, namely concerning the growth of the service sector, rising female
employment, and the increase in the level of education. The change has been very fast
(within two or three decades), but the social structure has remained static in many
respects as regards the organisation of the family, the school system, and women’s time
schedule of work.
“
In the last 40 years, Italian families have changed: the typical
middle-class family with the husband as breadwinner and the wife totally devoted to the
home, with a clear separation of the social tasks of the spouses, has quickly vanished
(…). Italian society has been more reluctant than elsewhere to adapt to the pressures of
economic and cultural change.” (Dalla Zuanna 2004). This is a fundamental key to
understanding why the level of fertility remains so low and why no clear sign of a
reverse trend is yet observed, despite the fact that the ideal number of children is always
definitely higher than effective fertility. The 1996 Fertility and Family Survey shows an
almost entirely generalised desire to have children: 98% of the 20–29-year-olds
interviewed declared that they wanted children. On average, the desired number of
children is 2.1 and the desire to have children remains unaltered even in more recent
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generations and even for women who have made large investments into their education
and want to achieve their career aspirations.
Many distinctive interrelated aspects need to be discussed when refering to the
‘failed societal adaptation’.
5.1 Lack of labour market flexibility
Women and young people face an inflexible labour market and, in an adult male
dominated society, adjustments have been taking place very slowly and reluctantly,
despite greater investment in human capital through enrolment in education. The data in
Table 7 show an increase in the proportion of people aged 15 or above with a university
or a higher-secondary degree, both comparing younger versus older ages and comparing
women versus men. Moreover, if one compares trends of the number of university
graduates per 100 individuals above age 25 by gender (Figure 12), it is evident that
women obtained better results than their male counterparts and that the gap is
increasing among the younger student cohorts.
Table 7: Population aged 15 and over by educational level, age and gender,
2004 (percentage composition by gender)
Age
groups
University doctorate,
degree and diploma
Senior secondary
school certificate
Vocational
qualification
Junior secondary
school certificate
Primary school
certificate
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females
25
–
29
11.3
16.4
46.1
49.3
6.3
5.4
32.6
25.7
3.7
3.2
30
–
34 13.0
18.4
36.4
39.1
6.8
7.0
39.3
31.4
4.5
4.1
35
–
39 11.8
14.2
32.2
34.5
7.8
8.8
42.0
36.5
6.2
6.0
40
–
44 11.3
11.5
30.1
30.9
7.0
9.1
44.5
39.0
7.1
9.6
45
–
49 11.0
11.2
30.9
25.9
6.9
9.1
38.5
34.4
12.6
19.3
50
–
54 11.5
10.4
25.1
19.7
6.5
6.7
35.4
30.2
21.5
33.0
55
–
59 9.7
7.7
21.3
14.6
5.6
5.0
29.8
23.3
33.6
49.4
60
–
64 7.9
4.4
17.3
11.5
3.5
3.5
24.8
19.1
46.4
61.5
65+ 5.5
2.2
9.8
6.3
1.9
1.7
17.0
11.2
65.7
78.7
Total 8.7
8.4
27.3
25.1
5.4
5.3
35.3
27.9
23.3
33.3
Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey, 2004.
De Rose, Racioppi & Zanatta: Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour
684 http://www.demographic-research.org
Figure 12: University graduates per 100 individuals age 25 and over
by gender and school year
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
Percent
Males
Females
Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey, 2004.
Nevertheless, the labour market is more favourable to men than it is to women,
even among university graduates. In fact, whatever the educational level, the
employment rate is higher for men than it is for women (Table 8). Employment rates for
Italy, including a comparison with the EU, show a persistent disadvantage of Italian
women and a high level of unemployment among young people. The figures in Table 9
highlight the peculiarity of the Italian employment system: Compared to the average of
European men, Italian employment rates are higher in the middle age groups and much
lower in the young and in the elderly age groups; the gender gap in Italy is
comparatively higher than in all European Union countries, especially for younger and
older age groups. The disadvantage of women is documented also by professional
segregation (Table 10). Women who work ‘at the top’ as managers or politicians
constitute a minority and they are highly underrepresented in that category, while they
prevail in the executive categories of the tertiary sector. Gender inequalities in income
are also documented. Women earn 30% less than men on average and the gender gap is
significant also when controlling for job characteristics, though decreasing by level of
qualification (Addis 2006; OD&M 2006). However, this does not discourage young
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women who, instead of staying home and dedicating themselves to childbearing, prefer
to invest in education and professional training; this leads to a further delay in family
formation. Employed women, especially those married and with children, face a very
rigid working-life organisation, mainly with regard to time schedules of work, making
it difficult for many of them to reconcile work activities with family life. Despite a
relatively generous maternity leave programme (see below), many working women
complain about the lack of flexibility in time organisation (ISTAT 2004). Not
surprisingly, then, among working mothers the activity rate of those aged 25-34 and 35-
44 steadily decreases with the number of children, while no such change is observed for
men (Table 11). One form of flexibility, namely part-time work options, has been
introduced recently. Italian workers, however, both male and female, take advantage of
this opportunity to a lesser degree than the rest of the EU (Table 12). In countries such
as Italy, where the option of part-time work is still very limited, its effect on fertility
may be ambiguous. The results of a recent comparative study (Del Boca et al. 2004)
using European Community Household Panel data (ECHP) show that, when controlling
for all personal, family, and available environmental contexts, Italian women still work
significantly less than women in France and the UK. If Italian women had access to the
same number of part-time positions as women in the UK, their participation would
increase by 52.5% and the fertility rates would decrease by 2.8%. In a country where
part-time work is rare, married women are forced to choose between not working and
working full-time. The growing availability of a third option would change the
available set of choices: If unemployed women chose to work part-time, their fertility
rates might decline. By contrast, if full-time working women chose to reduce their
working schedule, their fertility might increase. The net effect on fertility depends on
the magnitude of these different flows.
Women, however, look at part-time employment as an important resource to
reconcile work activity with the family (Del Boca 2002). In 2003, around 70% of part-
time working mothers declared to have chosen this form of employment in order to be
in a better position to take care of their children.
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Table 8: Employment rates by educational level and gender, 2004
Educational level
Males
Females
Primary school 25.6
8.0
Junior secondary school 61.0
33.3
Vocational qualification 76.7
55.9
High school 69.4
53.7
University 78.4
70.6
Total 57.4
34.3
Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey, 2004.
Table 9: Employment rates by gender and age in Italy and EU, 2002
EU Italy
Age groups
Males Females Total Males Females Total
15
–
19 25.7 21.2 23.5 11.6 6.9 9.3
20–24
61.0 52.1 56.6 46.7 33.4 40.0
25
–
29 80.9 67.2 74.1 71.6 52.1 61.9
30
–
34 88.4 68.3 78.5 86.5 58.3 72.5
35
–
39 89.9 68.8 79.4 91.5 58.4 75.1
40
–
44 89.5 70.3 80.0 91.8 57.0 74.5
45
–
49 88.4 68.6 78.5 91.5 54.0 72.7
50
–
54 83.0 60.4 71.6 81.3 42.4 61.7
55
–
59 66.0 43.9 54.8 53.1 26.3 39.4
60
–
64 32.8 16.3 24.3 29.3 8.1 18.3
65+ 5.5 2.1 3.5 6.1 1.3 3.3
Source
: ISTAT, Ministero per le Pari Opportunità (2004)- "Come cambia la vita delle donne", Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.
Table 10: Professional composition of employed men and women, 2004
Professions Absolute numbers (in thousands)
Males Females Total
Members of legislative bodies, managers & entrepreneurs 808 255 1063
Intellectual, scientific & highly specialized professions 1238 1023 2261
Intermediate professions technical experts 2335 2057 4392
Administrative & management executives 1038 1493 2531
Sales and household services 1637 1883 3520
Craftsmen, skilled workers & farmers 3597 672 4269
Plant & machinery operators, industrial assembly-line workers 1651 398 2049
Non-skilled workers 1064 997 2061
Armed Forces 253 5 258
Total (in thousands) 13622 8783 22405
Source
: Labour Force Survey 2004 (ISTAT,2006).
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Table 11: Employment rates of parents aged 25-64 by number of children,
gender and age, average 2004 (percentage values)
Males Females
Number of children
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
One child 92.8
94.9
88.3
43.3
55.1
66.3
52.0
19.8
Two children 90.9
94.1
89.9
52.6
38.9
54.4
50.6
25.0
Three children 84.6
90.7
87.5
55.5
25.9
37.5
40.0
23.3
Total 91.8
94.0
88.9
47.9
46.7
55.5
49.6
21.6
Source:
Elaboration on ISTAT data (Labour Force Survey 2004).
Table 12: Percentage of part-time employed in Italy and in the EU
by age groups and gender, 2002
Italy EU
Age groups
Males Females Males Females
25–34 4.2 17.5 4.
7
26.7
35–44 2.5 19.8 3.
4
36.8
45–54 2.7 13.5 3.
8
33.6
55–64 3.5 16.7 6.
0
33.1
Source:
ISTAT, Ministero per le Pari Opportunità (2004)- "Come cambia la vita delle donne".
5.2 An unbalanced gender system
Women have to cope with an unbalanced gender system in the family. Combining work
activities with childbearing and other family duties, including taking care of elderly
relatives, is entirely left to women’s adaptability. McDonald (2000) suggested that
fertility has fallen especially in societies and social groups where the public gender
system has evolved evenly, while the private gender system (i.e. of the couple) has
remained attached to more traditional asymmetries. In Italy, too, during the last 40
years, the public gender system changed in an even sense: Women now have access to
any profession, they achieve a higher educational level than men, and, when employed,
they work almost as hard as men, especially before entering motherhood. At the same
time, however, the couple’s sharing of housework is heavily unbalanced – not only
when the woman is a housewife (in the traditional logic of ‘job sharing’), but even
when she works full-time. Women need to and want to work in order to avoid an
income reduction as well as a loss of role and identity. At the same time, spending long
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688 http://www.demographic-research.org
hours on household chores, without any significant help from the husband, contributes
to making low fertility more than a choice.
The very low percentage (14%) of employed fathers out of the total number of
parents taking parental leave is a good indicator of the low engagement of male partners
in family duties. Moreover, the percentage of exits from the labour market due to family
issues is greatly differentiated by gender (Figure 13). Over 60% of women but less than
20% of men do so at ages 40-44. The youngest male cohorts appear to be more
available to take care of their children and 52% of them declare to be interested in
taking parental leave, provided that their employer allows them to do so.
Figure 13: Exit from labour market because of family duties
by gender and age, 2001-02
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-W
Percent
Males
Females
Source
: Centra M. (2003), Modelli di mobilità: ciclo vitale e partecipazione al mercato del lavoro in Battistoni L, Op, Cit.
A low level of fathers’ involvement in child care is another distinctive feature of
the Italian gender system. No more than 25% of fathers of children less than 5 years of
age are involved in the care of them. Again, the younger couples (i.e. unions formed in
the 1990s) appear to be more egalitarian, with the respective male partners being much
more collaborative (ISTAT 2005). Using Fertility and Family Surveys data in different
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countries, including Italy, Pinnelli and Di Giulio (2003) estimated that couples with
relatively small gender differences with respect to age, education, and work
involvement have the highest fertility. At the individual level, the fact that a married
working woman receives some help from the husband when looking after their children
or performing household chores has some significant and positive impacts on the risk
and timing of second or third births (Mencarini and Tanturri 2004; Cooke 2003) and
also affects her fertility intentions (Pinnelli and Fiori 2006).
5.3 The ‘delay syndrome’
Another distinctive feature of the Italian situation is the rigidity with which individual
and contextual factors affect the various stages of the life cycle: end of education, entry
into the labour market, exit from the family, entry into union, and formation of an
independent household. Closely related to this rigidity, and simultaneously a cause and
an effect, are the ‘costs’ of leaving the parental home. Of 100 young people aged 18-34,
the fraction of those living in the parental home increased between 1993 and 2003, both
for males and females, from 62.8% to 66.3% and from 48% to 52.9%, respectively.
Various explanations have been given, such as the high cost of housing and young adult
unemployment (Saraceno 2000). None of these are convincing, because also the
fraction of young Italian adults living with parents and in full-time employment is
rising, from 47.7% to 53.4% among males and from 34.2% to 37.4% among females
(Table 13). Moreover, young adults admit that they like to live in the parental home,
where they typically pay almost nothing for their upkeep, have their mother doing all
their cooking and washing, and can spend money on cars, vacations, and discos instead
(Sgritta 2001; Palomba 2001).
Compared to other countries, young people in Italy do not show any of the
flexibilities of young people in other European countries when they leave the family
home to go and live on their own, to study, to work, and above all to live with their
partner and have children (Billari and Rosina 2004). The delay in forming a family at a
relatively late age may lead, for various reasons, to not having children at all or to
reduced fertility due to being strongly accustomed to a certain lifestyle (Livi Bacci and
Salvini 2000).
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Table 13: Young people (18-34) not in union, living with their parents,
by gender and condition
Year Employed Searching for a job Housewife
(1)
Student
Other
Male
1993 47.7 22.1 - 25.3
4.9
2003 53.4 16.3 - 26.1
4.2
Female
1993 34.2 22.4 6.0 36.0
1.4
2003 37.4 19.1 2.5 39.3
1.8
Source:
Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie “Aspetti della vita quotidiana” Year 2000, ISTAT 2005.
(1) This includes not active young people caring after the house.
5.4 Too much family
The last social collective process which, we believe, helps to maintain the gap between
desired and actual fertility in Italy is the persistence of strong ties between parents and
children. Parents invest a lot in their (only) child and a very high cost-value is attributed
to these children, which in Italy is shouldered entirely by the family. Not having a
second or third child seems to be resulting from the fear of lowering the child’s quality
of life, who is highly protected by its parents. Moreover, as the children’s prospects of
social mobility have been low or nonexistent for a long time, Italian families show little
enthusiasm to push their children ‘out of the family nest’. In Italy, proximity parameters
between children and parents are strong: Young adults leave home later and later and,
when they go, they often reside nearby, and visits between parents and children are very
frequent (Dalla Zuanna 2004). The persistent proximity between parents and children
favours intense exchanges of all kinds between the generations: Parents support
children until they leave the parental home and help them financially in buying a flat or
a house and in organising the very expensive (religious) marriage ceremony; they also
are expected to become good grandparents; children in turn will ensure emotional and
material sustenance for their parents when they become elderly.
The consequence of these factors is that young people in general seem to live in a
context that is characterised by strong family ties, and it does not favour independent
life choices. This may also help to explain why the welfare system is ungenerous with
families that have children: In a society centred on family ties, there is little room for
the state. A very instructive example is the use of childcare services. In Italy, the vast
majority of children aged 3-5 attend nursery school, a proportion as high as, or higher
than, that found in many other European countries with higher female labour-force
participation rates. However, according to ISTAT data collected in 1998, only 8% of
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Italian children aged 0-2 went to public day care and, in 2002, 56% of all women then
in the work force who had given birth between July 2000 and June 2001 had their
babies cared for by the babies’ grandparents while they were out to work. Thus, the lack
of public services offering child care is partly due to a low demand for these services
owing to a strong cultural bias against the practice to send the smallest children outside
the home.
Families tend to solve their tensions by themselves; therefore, institutions are not
particularly pressed to intervene. Given this strong orientation towards the ‘private
value’ of children, it is difficult to recognize their ‘collective value’ (Livi Bacci 2001).
5.5 Too much Church and too little religiosity
The causal link between Catholicism and marital and reproductive behaviour is not easy
to establish. On the one hand, is the function of the Church in public life as a cultural
and political institution; on the other, the influence of religious feelings and the set of
values on private affairs. Despite the large influence on public life exerted by the
Catholic Church through the dominant political party, the Democrazia Cristiana,
through the end of the 1980s, many liberal laws were approved by a large and diverse
parliamentary majority during the 1970s: a divorce law in 1970, a law passed in 1971
permitting contraceptive advertising, a reform of norms regulating family relationships
in 1975, and a law legalising abortion in 1978. In many cases, the political battles were
very hard.
During the 1990s, Democrazia Cristiana was swept away by corruption scandals;
other minor Catholic parties were founded on the left and right of the political spectrum
but their political power cannot be compared to that of the previous period.
Nevertheless, the influence of the Catholic Church on public issues is still notable. For
example, a law on medically-assisted reproduction approved by the Italian Parliament
in 2003 contains significant restrictions based on Catholic principles: The intervention
is permitted only for married couples without resorting to any outside sperm or ovule
donors. Also, the current discussion on the legal status of informal unions is strongly
influenced by the Catholic parties. In general, public life and the institutional setting are
constantly influenced by the Catholic ethical viewpoint.
The same contradiction is evident when we look at individual behaviour. In the
mid-1990s, 97% of people aged 18 and older declared themselves to have been baptized
into the Catholic Church; however, no more than half of them regularly participated in
religious rites. The participation is even lower among young people, especially men
(Table 14). As far as family life is concerned, Italian people are far from following the
prescriptions of the Church, neither on sexual and contraceptive behaviour (as
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692 http://www.demographic-research.org
mentioned above) nor on spousal behaviour. Separation and divorce are continuously
increasing as well as informal unions, especially among the youngest generations.
Similarly with respect to fertility: Expectations and ideals are influenced by religious
principles, but actual choices and behaviours are impacted much less so (Dalla Zuanna
2004). The persistent influence of the Church at a political level contributes to delays in
the spreading of modern behaviours, which might lead to an institutional and cultural
context favourable to childbearing.
Table 14: Persons aged 6 and over by frequency of attendance at a
place of worship and by age and gender (per 100 persons
of the same age and sex) - Year 2003
Once a week (at least)
Never
Age group
Male
Female
Male
Female
6–13 59.5
63.8
7.7
5.7
14–17 30.9
43.9
15.3
12.3
18–19 19.3
29.7
23.5
13.5
20–24 13.7
25.7
27.3
16.8
25–34 16.3
27.8
23.3
15.0
35–44 18.9
33.5
21.0
12.2
45–54 21.9
41.3
19.2
9.8
55–59 25.1
48.2
17.9
7.9
60–64 32.0
55.0
15.6
7.2
65–74 38.3
59.8
15.6
7.4
75 + 36.8
48.7
21.4
19.0
Total 27.1
42.9
19.0
11.6
Source:
Indagine multiscopo sulle famiglie “Aspetti della vita quotidiana” Year 2003, ISTAT 2005.
6. Family policies
Fertility trends have been clear for a number of years and demographers have tried to
draw attention to them. However, public concern for policy reform is very recent, and
strongly related to the fear of the consequences of low fertility, namely the crisis of the
pension system and in the context of growing foreign immigration.
The two preceding governments (1996-2001; 2001-2006) and the present one have
directly addressed this question, but the overall context is still unfavourable in terms of
persuading women and men to have the number of children consistent with their desires
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and ideals. First, compared to other European countries public transfers to families and
children are not generous. Second, the societal context in which children are raised is
not child-friendly in terms of time use, mobility, and public spaces. Third, the need of
women and mothers (and fathers) to reconcile their activities inside and outside the
family is largely unmet. Fourth, the late transition to adulthood in Italy heavily depends
on the functioning of the education system, that of the labour market, and housing
arrangements.
A brief description of the main measures currently effective follows.
6.1 Financial support
6.1.1 Indirect financial support
Working people are allowed fiscal deductions for both children and other dependent
relatives, including the no-income marital partner; until 1998, the rate of deduction was
higher for the spouse (namely the wife) than for children, thus discouraging married
women from entering the labour market. Since 1998, the rate of deduction for children
has been substantially increased, matching the level for spouses.
6.1.2 Direct financial support
There is no generalized form of income transfer to the family. All transfers are linked to
the family and the individual’s income.
Family allowance, is granted only to employed, unemployed, and retired people
with very low income; the amount depends on the number of family members and the
family situation (it is higher for a single-parent family or for a family member with a
handicap).
Maternity allowance of 250 Euro per month for 5 months, established in 1999,
which is given to the mother whose family income is relatively low (lower than 25,800
Euros annually). It is now given also to foreign women.
Family allowance for three or more children, is 103 Euro per month granted to
large families with an income close to the poverty threshold.
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6.2 Social policies favourable to work-family reconciliation
6.2.1 Maternal leave
Maternal leave is compulsory and lasts 5 months, to be taken prior to or after delivery,
depending on the woman’s choice. In exceptional cases, it can be granted to the father
instead of the mother. The woman has the right to maintain her job and she receives no
less than 80% of her salary (paid by social security). This measure was introduced in
1971 only for employed women; in 1987 it was extended to self-employed women and
in 1990 to highly skilled professionals (lawyers, medical doctors, architects; etc.); more
recently it was extended also for women with a temporary job.
6.2.2 Parental leave
According to a recent law (8 March 2000 n. 53), parental leave is voluntary and
provides the right for fathers as well as mothers to stay home for 6 months each until
the child reaches the age of 8; the job is preserved and they receive 30% of the salary
(80%-100% if they work in the public sector). Law no. 53 provides the father with the
legal right by choice to take care of his child, even when his spouse (or partner) is a
housewife or is self-employed. Employers receive some fiscal benefits if parental leave
(especially for male employees) is not discouraged. Some positive effects of this law on
fathers’ participation in childcare have already been observed.
6.3 Flexibility of the labour market
Both the law mentioned above and the more comprehensive law on work flexibility,
passed in 2003, introduced many fiscal and monetary incentives to employers who
allow for some forms of flexibility such as part-time employment, flexible working
hours, shift work, job sharing, and remote work. These possibilities have not been
proposed to directly affect childbearing but they could be family friendly, if used not
only in the employers’ interest, but also in the interest of workers and their family.
6.4 Child care services
As observed above, social service provisions for families with young children are
largely insufficient. There are very few kindergartens for infants aged 0-2 (in 2000,
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only 7.4% of children aged 0-2 attended kindergartens, and attendance concentrated
mostly in the northern-central regions). In 2002, the government approved and partially
financed a number of projects for kindergartners in many private workplaces. The
service is fee-paying, and the charge depends on parental income. In larger cities, such
as Rome, the kindergarten calendar starts on 1
September and ends on 30 June, offering
a full day of service, from 7:00 to 18:00.
The supply of private and public schools for children aged 3-5 is much broader. In
the school year 2000-01, 100% of children aged 3-5 attended school. The organisational
model of the public childcare schools may vary from town to town and, partly, from
school to school. The service is free of charge; a contribution can be required for the
school canteen and transport. The opening date is established by the regional school
calendar and the closing date is usually 30 June. In the larger cities, parents can choose
between two timetables: morning classes — from Monday to Friday, 8:00 - 13:20 —
and full time classes — from Monday to Friday, 8:00 - 17:00.
6.5 Policies of the present and recent past concerning population and family
The poor development of family policies in Italy captured by the Mediterranean Model
– whose features have been depicted in the present chapter – can be explained by
historical, political, and ideological reasons:
A very long tradition of strong family ties, weak public institutions, and territorial
differences;
A family model with traditional and patriarchal relationships some of which
continue to this day;
The experience of fascism: For the first and only time in Italy, during the 1930s
and early 1940s, explicit demographic and family policies were pursued to increase the
birth rate, to strengthen the authority of the ‘husband – father’, and to subordinate the
family to the political objectives and to the principles of the regime;
The strong belief (only recently weakened due to awareness-raising campaigns of
demographers) that Italy was already over-populated and that therefore a policy aimed
at an elevated birth rate was not needed.
The lack of an explicit family policy in Republican and democratic Italy ever since
the war can be partly explained by citing the fascist heritage and the need to distance
oneself from its demographic policy objectives. Moreover, it is worth adding the post-
war conflict concerning family values among the political and cultural forces that has
been lasting to date (Saraceno 2003), with the Catholic Church and the Catholic-
inspired party, Democrazia Cristiana, aiming at protecting the unity of the family on
the one side; and the Marxist-inspired political forces (Communist and Socialist Parties)
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and the anti-clerical-liberal-oriented forces aiming at promoting individual freedom and
rights (radical and liberal parties) on the other.
Moreover, one should take into account that until the 1960s, many services for
children and the elderly were directly or indirectly managed by the Catholic Church,
which sought to keep control over this field, thus hampering the development of public
services.
However, in the 1970s, there was a brief period when public social services for
women and families were being developed. This was the period of rising female
employment, of the feminist movement, of some local left wing administrations, of the
left-centre wing governments. In the late 1970s, the Catholic Party and the Communist
Party briefly compromised on some issues (the so-called ‘historical compromise’).
During this period, the state nursery schools for 3-5 -year- olds was instituted (1969),
together with the municipal kindergartens for children up to 3 years of age (1971).
Other important issues of this period were measures concerning compulsory and
optional maternal leave for employed women (1971), the divorce law (1970), the new
family legislation (1975) establishing legal equality between husband and wife and
between legitimate and extra-marital children, the institution of family-planning
services (1975), a law on equal gender opportunities in the workplace, which to a
certain extent allows even fathers to receive optional leave (1977), a law introducing the
legalization of abortion (1978); and the institution of the national health system (1978).
With these measures, the period of expanding public services in Italy came to an
end. In the 1980s, the crisis of the Welfare State began, a financial and structural crisis
that continues to date.
6.6 A short overview of the major political parties’ position on fertility issues and
policies
The policymakers’ awareness of the importance of policies supporting families,
especially those with children, is relatively recent and dates back to the second half of
the 1980s. Only in this period did political parties start considering enacting laws to
deal with family behaviour. Such laws would also aim at supporting fertility, but
through different modalities and tools, according to the different ideological trends.
To sum up, we can highlight four main objectives:
a) supporting families through social services, mainly aimed at children and the
elderly;
b) supporting reconciliation between family and working commitments and supporting
gender equality;
c) an opposition to abortion, and support of maternity;
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d) the reform of the family tax system, aimed at reducing taxes for families with
children.
The first two objectives have been promoted by left-wing parties and left-wing
local administrations; the remainder have been advanced by the Democrazia Cristiana
and by right-wing parties, e.g., the Italian Social Movement (MSI), according to the
various declarations made by the political parties on family issues.
During the electoral campaigns of 1994, 1996 and 2001, family policies gained
importance in the programmes of the party coalition (left-centre camp and right-centre
camp) and the issue of supporting fertility assumed higher prominence in both camps.
In these years, family support was one of the main issues in the political debate.
According to the right-centre camp to be achieved by financial help and reduced taxes
for families with children. The left-centre camp demanded financial support for families
as well as the introduction of measures aimed at reconciling family with working
commitments, such as a wider application of parental leave (following a European
Union regulation issued in 1996) and the development of services for children.
Another topic of interest was the recognition of unmarried heterosexual and
homosexual couples, strongly opposed by the right-centre parties. The left-centre
coalition widely agrees on the need of these unions to be recognized, even if a
distinction between heterosexual unions and homosexual unions is highly
recommended.
What can be seen as the very first family policy in the recent period dates back to
the first “Ulivo” government (left-centre coalition, 1996-2001). A great number of
interventions were made in the social service management system, in the field of
financial support for families, and to reconcile family and working commitments.
Among the initiatives supporting fertility and introduced by the right-centre
government (2001-06), a bonus of 1000 Euro for any second or higher-order birth was
introduced. This option was not available in 2004 and 2005 owing to a lack of funding,
but was re-introduced in 2006 for first order births.
The newly elected government (in office since April 2006) headed by a left-centre
coalition promises a great wealth of measures to establish a net of citizenship rights that
are individual and family-centred
7
. The main objectives are:
To promote two types of basic freedoms for young people: becoming independent
from their parents and being able to start their own family.
To support women’s right to work, without renouncing maternity.
To reconcile work and family life.
To solve the housing problem.
These are some of the measures suggested by the government:
7
See www.unioneweb.it/wp-content/uploads/documents/programma_def_unione.pdf.
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6.6.1 To reconcile work with personal and family life
- To promote the option of paternal and maternal leave.
To increase the amount of income from parental leave.
To integrate current income with an anticipation of the end-of-job alimony.
6.6.2 Educational services for children and families
Increase national and regional public resources to establish a network of high-quality
educational and integrated services for children, aimed at promoting the development
and health of children and in supporting parents’ reconciliation of work with child care
and education.
Increase the accessibility of kindergartens to all families who request a place in
such an institution, through means-tested subsidies.
6.6.3 Investing in the future: an allowance for each child, a deposit account for
each young boy or girl
Two measures aimed at supporting each newborn and each young boy or girl nearing
independence:
The first measure aims to recognize the social value of motherhood and paternity,
giving each child an income that provides financial help for the family until the child
reaches age 18. It is an allowance supporting family responsibilities and represents an
addition to the family income. This allowance increases with the number of family
members, irrespective of the parents’ working conditions. The support is mainly aimed
at low and average income families.
The second measure provides a principal for each newborn and can be used at the
age of 18. The idea is that the state opens an individual deposit account for each
newborn, increasing it with annual contributions (even with the support of the family)
until he/she is 18 years old. At this age, the young person may use the money to pay
university fees, to pay for professional training or to invest into company start-up
activities. The principal will be repaid at no interest. Similar deposit accounts are
opened for children who were younger than 17 years of age at the time when the law
was issued.
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6.6.4 Solving the housing problem
Provide the option of loans for the first home of young couples and establish a special
bond fund, designed to facilitate repayment of the loans.
7. Conclusion
The main idea we aimed to develop in this paper is that the very low fertility level in
Italy is strongly related to the delayed and limited diffusion of modern family and
partnership behaviours, which are in turn slowed by the lagged adaptation of Italy’s
institutions to social change. The Italian story, in fact, is a story in which cultural,
economic, and religious forces have interacted to produce an environment in which
bearing only one or two children is the outcome for most couples, even though fertility
intentions might have been considerably higher. The numerous obstacles for the young
in entering adult life and, at the same time, society’s reluctance to accept new forms of
living arrangements alternative to marriage make people delay or renounce entering a
union and forming a new household. Also, the gender system, which apparently favours
maintaining a traditional family system, is not compatible with a situation in which
more and more women reach a higher level of human capital and are increasingly
stimulated to enter the labour market, even as a consequence of population ageing.
In a society where it is the family which is expected to find the resources it needs
(both material and immaterial), and where both men and women are expected to
participate in the labour force, social policies are scarcely adequate to support families
with children and to promote further fertility. The main effort is addressed to give
financial support, even if the amount is very low and limited to a minority of very low
income families. Other interventions, which may be useful in the process of role
reconciliation, such as childcare public services, increased labour market flexibility, a
convincing promotion of more equal gender roles, and male involvement in family care,
are woefully inadequate.
Recent significant legislative innovations, such as the reform of the school system
and of universities, and the measures aimed at enhancing the flexibility of the labour
market will certainly have some impact on families and young people’s behaviours, but
the direction this will take is questionable. A once only (una tantum) financial support
to childbearing is likely to have only a short-time effect, however it demonstrates the
concern for persistently low fertility in Italy. Finally, the lack of a serious discussion on
recognizing the right to informal and homosexual unions (except for a very recent bill
introduced in February 2007 to be discussed in the Parliament), on the approval of the
restrictive law on medically-assisted reproduction, and the recurrent attacks by the
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700 http://www.demographic-research.org
Catholic parties on laws legalizing divorce and abortion are aspects that confirm the
extent to which Italian society still resists the diffusion of individual and family
behaviours that could be consistent with a childbearing recovery.
Some signs of modern behaviour, both in partnership and contraception, can be
seen in the cohorts born after the mid-1960s. Among these cohorts, cohabitation is
spreading, civil marriages are more common, sexual relationships are more egalitarian
and they increasingly rely on modern contraception. The younger cohorts also witness
postponement and recuperation of childbearing, but it is questionable whether a
definitive rise in fertility can be expected if the framework of societal and policy
conditions remains unchanged. Without a serious effort by Italy’s political parties to
dismantle at least some of the barriers for the young and for women, fertility will
remain low for a long time.
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