The impact of disinformation
on democratic processes and
human rights in the world
@Adobe Stock
Authors:
Carme COLOMINA, Héctor SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF, Richard YOUNGS
European Parliament coordinator:
Policy Department for External Relations
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union
PE 653.635 - April 2021
EN
STUDY
Requested by the DROI subcommittee
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT
EP/EXPO/DROI/FWC/2019-01/LOT6/R/02 EN
April 2021 - PE 653.635 © European Union, 2021
STUDY
The impact of disinformation on
democratic processes and human rights
in the world
ABSTRACT
Around the world, disinformation is spreading and becoming a more complex
phenomenon based on emerging techniques of deception. Disinformation
undermines human rights and many elements of good quality democracy; but
counter-disinformation measures can also have a prejudicial impact on human rights
and democracy. COVID-19 compounds both these dynamics and has unleashed more
intense waves of disinformation, allied to human rights and democracy setbacks.
Effective responses to disinformation are needed at multiple levels, including formal
laws and regulations, corporate measures and civil society action. While the EU has
begun to tackle disinformation in its external actions, it has scope to place greater
stress on the human rights dimension of this challenge. In doing so, the EU can draw
upon best practice examples from around the world that tackle disinformation
through a human rights lens. This study proposes steps the EU can take to build
counter-disinformation more seamlessly into its global human rights and democracy
policies.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
ISBN: 978-92-846-8014-6 (pdf) ISBN: 978-92-846-8015-3 (paper)
doi:10.2861/59161 (pdf) doi:10.2861/677679 (paper)
Catalogue number: QA-02-21-559-EN-N (pdf) Catalogue number: QA-02-21-559-EN-C (paper)
AUTHORS
• Carme COLOMINA, Research Fellow, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), Spain
• Héctor SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF, Researcher, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), Spain
• Richard YOUNGS, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• Academic reviewer: Kate JONES, Associate Fellow, Chatham House; Faculty of Law, University of Oxford,
United Kingdom
PROJECT
COORDINATOR (CONTRACTOR)
• Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)
This study was originally requested by the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights.
The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author(s), and any opinions expressed herein do
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.
CONTACTS
IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Coordination: Marika LERCH, Policy Department for External Policies
Editorial assistant: Daniela ADORNA DIAZ
Feedback is welcome. Please write to marika.lerch@europarl.europa.eu
To obtain copies, please send a request to poldep-expo@europarl.europa.eu
VERSION
English-language manuscript completed on 22 April 2021.
COPYRIGHT
Brussels © European Union, 2021
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.
This paper will be published on the European Parliament's online database, '
Think Tank'
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
Table of contents
Executive Summary v
1 Introduction and methodology 1
2 Understanding the concept of disinformation 2
2.1 Definition of disinformation 3
2.2 Instigators and Agents of disinformation 6
2.3 Tools and tactics 6
2.4 Motivations for disinformation 8
3 The impacts of disinformation and
counter-disinformation measures on human rights and
democracy 9
3.1 Impacts on human rights 10
3.1.1 Right to freedom of thought and the right to hold opinions
without interference 10
3.1.2 The right to privacy 10
3.1.3 The right to freedom of expression 11
3.1.4 Economic, social and cultural rights 12
3.2 Impact on democratic processes 13
3.2.1 Weakening of trust in democratic institutions and society 13
3.2.2 The right to participate in public affairs and election
interference 14
3.3 Digital violence and repression 15
3.4 Counter-disinformation risks 16
4 The impact of disinformation during the COVID-19 crisis 18
4.1 Acceleration of existing trends 21
4.2 The impact of the COVID-19 infodemia on Human Rights 21
5 Mapping responses: Legislative and regulatory bodies,
corporate activities and civil society 23
5.1 Legislative and regulatory bodies 25
5.2 Corporate activities 26
5.3 Civil Society 29
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
6 EU responses to disinformation 29
6.1 The EU’s policy framework and instruments focusing on
disinformation and European democracy 31
6.1.1 The EEAS Strategic Communication Division 31
6.1.2 The Rapid Alert System 32
6.1.3 The Action Plan Against Disinformation and the Code of
Practice on Disinformation 32
6.1.4 The European Digital Media Observatory 33
6.1.5 The European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital
Services Act 33
6.2 Key elements of the EU’s external Human Rights and
Democracy Toolbox 33
6.2.1 EU human rights guidelines 33
6.2.2 EU engagement with civil society and human rights
dialogues 34
6.2.3 Election observation and democracy support 34
6.2.4 The Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy for
2020-2024 and funding tools 35
6.2.5 Restrictive measures 36
6.3 The European Parliament’s role 37
7 Rights-based initiatives against disinformation:
identifying best practices 39
7.1 Government and parliamentary responses 39
7.2 Civil society pathways 42
7.2.1 Middle East and North Africa 43
7.2.2 Asia 43
7.2.3 Eastern Europe 43
7.2.4 Latin America 44
7.2.5 Africa 44
7.2.6 Multi-regional projects 44
8 Conclusions and recommendations 46
8.1 Empowering Societies against Disinformation 47
8.1.1 Supporting local initiatives addressing disinformation 48
8.1.2 Enhancing support to media pluralism within
disinformation strategies 48
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
iii
8.1.3 Responding rapidly to disinformation surges 48
8.1.4 Empowering small-scale deliberative forums targeting
disinformation 48
8.1.5 Developing human rights training 48
8.2 Global dialogue 49
Bibliography 50
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
1
1 Introduction and methodology
This study considers the impact of online disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in
countries outside the European Union. The scope of analysis is limited to legal content shared online; illegal
content poses very different political and legal considerations. The study explores both the human rights
breaches caused by disinformation as well as those caused by laws and actions aimed at tackling this
phenomenon. Our research covered both EU institutional and civil society perspectives in detail.
The study analyses how the EU can better equip itself to tackle disinformation worldwide while protecting
human rights. It explores public and private initiatives in third countries, identifying best practices of rights-
based initiatives. Special attention is given to recent and current EU proposals, actions and instruments of
significant relevance to tackling disinformation in third countries.
Our research methodology included a systematic desk-review of the existing literature on disinformation,
human rights and democracy, relying on four types of sources: official documents, communication from
stakeholders, scholarly literature and press articles. This study builds from the research published by
international organisations, like UNESCO and the Council of Europe, and human rights resolutions from
international bodies, including the UN Human Rights Council.
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted between September 2020 and January 2021. The
interviews were conducted under Chatham House rule, meaning that interviewees’ comments are taken
into account but not attributed in this report. The interviewees included staff members from several
divisions of the European External Action Service (EEAS) – including its StratCom unit – and representatives
from the Directorate General for International Cooperation (DEVCO, now the DG for International
Partnerships, INTPA), as well as MEPs representing different political groups within the European
Parliament. We prioritised MEPs who are members of the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) or, in
their absence, members of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in All Democratic Processes
within the EU, Including Disinformation (INGE) or Members from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET),
respecting gender balance at all times. The authors contacted more than one MEP per group, but the ratio
of responses was low. Nonetheless, interviews were conducted with one MEP for each political group
except for MEPs from the Identity and Democracy Group (ID), which did not respond to our request.
Members from the Non-attached group (NI) were not contacted
1
. The authors would like to thank all the
interviewees for their kind contributions.
Moreover, input was collected from civil society organisations through the European Endowment for
Democracy (EED). The methodology sought to reflect the equal importance of formal institutional
approaches and civil society responses to disinformation. The selection of best practices draws on a global
civil society research project coordinated by one of the authors, which took place over the four years
previous to this study. The project engaged with human rights defenders from all regions of the world who
are active on these issues. This research project includes original fieldwork and empirical studies
2
.
1
Interview with an MEP from the European People’s Party sitting in the Subcommittee on Human Rights on the 23rd of October,
2020; interview with an MEP from the Socialist and Democrats sitting in the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs on the 5th of October 2020; interview with an MEP from the Renew group sitting in the Committee on Foreign
Affairs on the 17th of December 2020; interview with an MEP from the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance sitting in the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the 14th of January 2021; interview with an MEP from
the European Conservatives and Reformists Group sitting in the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic
Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation on the 12th of January 2021; and interview with an MEP from the Left
Group sitting in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the 29th of October 2020. MEPs represented a total of six political groups out
of eight, with three women and three men interviewed.
2
Carnegie’s Civic Research Network is a global group of leading experts and activists dedicated to examining the changing patterns
of civic activism around the world.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
2
2 Understanding the concept of disinformation
‘
How can we make sense of democratic values in a world of
digital disinformation run amok? What does freedom of speech
mean in an age of trolls, bots, and information war? Do we
really have to sacrifice freedom to save democracy
—
or is there
another way?
’
Peter Pomerantsev, Agora Institute, John Hopkins
University and London School of Economics
3
Key takeaways
• The concept of disinformation refers to false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed,
presented and promoted intentionally to cause public harm or make a profit.
• Disinformation has spread rapidly with the rise of social media. Over 40 % of people surveyed in
different regions of the world are concerned that it has caused increased polarisation and more foreign
interference in politics.
• Disinformation can confuse and manipulate citizens; create distrust in international norms, institutions
or democratically agreed strategies; disrupt elections; or feed disbelief in key challenges such as climate
change.
• The more this phenomenon expands globally and the more multi-faceted it becomes, the more
necessary it is to address not only the content dimension of disinformation but simultaneously the
tactics of manipulative influence that accompany it. It is also important to understand the motivations
for disinformation – political, financial or reputational (to build influence) – so that these can be
addressed.
The internet has provided unprecedented amounts of information to huge numbers of people worldwide.
However, at the same time, false, trivial and decontextualised information has also been disseminated. In
providing more direct access to content, less mediated by professional journalism, digital platforms have
replaced editorial decisions with engagement-optimising algorithms that prioritise clickbait content
4
.
Social networks have transformed our personal exposure to information, persuasion and emotive imagery
of all kinds.
In recent years, the transmission of disinformation has increased dramatically across the world. While
providing for a plurality of voices, a democratisation of access to information and a powerful tool for
activism, the internet has also created new technological vulnerabilities. An MIT Media Lab research found
that lies disseminate ‘farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth’ and falsehoods were ‘70 %
more likely to be retweeted than the truth’
5
. False content has potentially damaging impacts on core
3
Annenberg Public Policy Center
,
Freedom and Accountability: A Transatlantic Framework for Moderating Speech Online
,
Final
Report of the Transatlantic High Level Working Group on Content Moderation Online and Freedom of Expression, June 2020.
4
Karen Kornbluh and Ellen P. Goodman, Safeguarding Digital Democracy. Digital Innovation and Democracy Initiative Roadmap
,
The German Marshall Fund of the United States DIDI Roadmap n 4, March 2020.
5
Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy and Sinan Aral, The spread of true and false news online. Science, vol 359(6380), 2018, pp 1146-
1151.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
3
human rights and even the functioning of democracy. Disinformation can serve to confuse or manipulate
citizens; create distrust in international norms, institutions or democratically agreed strategies; disrupt
elections; or fuel disbelief in key challenges such as climate change
6
.
The graph below (Figure 1), on public perceptions of the impact of digital platforms, presents the results
of interviews with over 1 000 people in 25 countries in late 2018 and early 2019. It shows that over 50 % of
people considered that whilst social media had increased their ability to communicate and access
information, they had mixed feelings about the impact on inter-personal relations. Over 40 % of people
perceived that social media had contributed to both polarisation and foreign meddling in politics.
Figure 1. The impact of digital platforms: public perceptions
7
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on CIGI-Ipsos, 2019 CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust., 2019; CIGI-Ipsos,
Internet security and Trust. Part 3, 2019.
2.1 Definition of disinformation
For the European Union, the concept of disinformation refers to ‘verifiably false or misleading information
that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public and
may cause public harm’
8
. A similar definition was also adopted by the Report of the independent High-
6
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
7
The percentage refers to people interviewed in 25 different countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa,
Republic of Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States) accounting for 1.000+ individuals in each country during
December 2018 and February 2019: See the original source (CIGI IPSOS Global Survey) for more information about the
methodology employed.
8
European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Action Plan against Disinformation, JOIN(2018) 36 final,
December 2018.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
4
Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation published in March 2018
9
. Under this definition, the
risk of harm includes threats to democratic political processes and values. The production and promotion
of disinformation can be motivated by economic factors, reputational goals or political and ideological
agendas. It can be exacerbated by the ways in which different audiences and communities receive, engage
and amplify disinformation
10
. This definition is in line with the one adopted in a note produced by the
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in 2015
11
.
The authors of Disinformation and propaganda
–
impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its
Member States
12
use the terms ‘disinformation’ and ‘propaganda’ to describe phenomena characterised by
four features, namely that: is ‘designed to be false or manipulated or misleading (disinformation) or is
content using unethical persuasion techniques (propaganda); has the intention of generating insecurity,
tearing cohesion or inciting hostility, or directly to disrupt democratic processes; is on a topic of public
interest; and often uses automated dissemination techniques to amplify the effect of the communication’.
Immediately after the 2016 US election, concepts such as ‘alternative facts’, ‘post-truth’ and ‘fake news’
entered into public discourse. Even though the term ‘fake news’ emerged around the end of the 19th
century, it has become too vague and ambiguous to capture the essence of disinformation. Since the term
‘fake news’ is commonly used as a weapon to discredit the media, experts have called for this term to be
abandoned altogether in favour of more precise terminology
13
. The High-Level Group on Fake News and
Online Disinformation also took the view that ‘fake news’ is an inadequate term, not least because
politicians use it self-servingly to dismiss prejudicial coverage
14
.
Wardle and Derakhshan categorise three types of information disorders to differentiate between messages
that are true and those that are false, as well as determining which are created, produced, or distributed
by ‘agents’ who intend to do harm and those that are not
15
. These three types of information disorders –
dis-information, mis-information and mal-information – are illustrated in Table 1. The intention to harm or
profit is the key distinction between disinformation and other false or erroneous content.
9
Here, disinformation refers to false, inaccurate or misleading information designed, presented and promoted intentionally to
cause public harm or make a profit. See Independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation, A multi-
dimensional approach to disinformation, Report for the European Commission, March 2018.
10
Independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation, March 2018.
11
Authors' note: The European Parliamentary Research Service, in its 2015 At a glance paper, used the Oxford English Dictionary’s
definition of disinformation: ‘dissemination of deliberately false information, especially when supplied by a government or its
agent to a foreign power or to the media, with the intention of influencing the policies or opinions of those who receive it; false
information so supplied’. It also acknowledged that in some official communications, the European Parliament has used the term
propaganda when referring to Russia’s disinformation campaigns or even misinformation, although there is consensus that
misinformation happens unintentionally.
12
Judit Bayer, Natalija Bitiukova, Petra Bárd, Judit Szakács, Alberto Alemanno and Erik Uszkiewicz, ‘Disinformation and propaganda
– impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its Member States’, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the
Union (IPOL), European Parliament, 2019.
13
Margaret Sullivan, It’s Time To Retire the Tainted Term Fake News, Washington Post, 6 January 2017. [Accessed on 26 March 2021].
14
Independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation, Report
for the European Commission, March 2018.
15
Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy
making, Council of Europe report DGI(2017)09, 2017.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
5
Table 1. Types of Information Disorders
Definition
Example
Misinformation
When
false information
is shared, but no harm is
meant
A terror attack on the Champs Elysees on 20 April
2017 generated a great amount of misinformation in
social networks, spreading rumours and unconfirmed
information
16
. People sharing that kind of
information didn't mean to cause harm.
Disinformation
When false information
is knowingly shared to
cause harm
During the 2017 French presidential elections, a
duplicate version of the Belgian newspaper Le Soir
was created, with a false article claiming that
Emmanuel Macron was being funded by Saudi
Arabia
17
.
Malinformation
When
genuine
information is shared to
cause harm
The intentional leakage of a politician’s private
emails, as happened during the presidential elections
in France 2017
18
.
Source and examples: Wardle and Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy
making, Council of Europe report DGI(2017)09, 2017.
The challenge posed by disinformation comes not only from its content, but also how it is distributed and
promoted on social media. The intention to harm or profit that characterises disinformation itself entails
that disinformation is commonly accompanied by strategies and techniques to maximise its influence.
Hence, the European Democracy Action Plan
19
– the European Commission’s agenda to strengthen the
resilience of EU democracies – broadens the discussion from tackling disinformation to also tackling
‘information influence operations’ and ‘foreign interference in the information space’. Both these concepts
encompass coordinated efforts to influence a targeted audience by deceptive means, the latter involving
a foreign state actor or its agents. EU external strategies need to respond not only to the challenge of
disinformation, but to these deceptive influence strategies more broadly.
Social media platforms are already tackling these challenges of influence to some extent. For instance,
Facebook tackles ’coordinated inauthentic behaviour’, understood as ‘coordinated efforts to manipulate
public debate for a strategic goal where fake accounts are central to the operation’
20
. Twitter’s ‘platform
manipulation’ refers to the ‘unauthorised use of Twitter to mislead others and/or disrupt their experience
by engaging in bulk, aggressive, or deceptive activity’
21
. Similarly, Google reports on ‘coordinated influence
operation campaigns’
22
.
16
One example of this, mentioned by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), was the rumour that Muslim population in the UK had
celebrated the attack. This was debunked by CrossCheck. For more information on the role of social media that night, also read
Soren Seelow ‘Attentat des Champs-Elysées : le rôle trouble des réseaux sociaux’, in Le Monde, 4 May 2017.
17
EU vs. Disinfo, ‘EMMANUEL MACRON’S CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN FUNDED BY SAUDI ARABIA, SINCE…’, published on 2 February
2017. [Accessed on 11 February 2021].
18
Meghan Mohan, Macron Leaks: the anatomy of a hack, BBC, published on 9 May 2017. [Accessed on 11 February 2021]
19
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Action Plan, COM (2020) 790 final,
December 2020.
20
Facebook, December 2020 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report, January 2021. [Accessed on 11 February 2021].
21
Twitter Transparency Center, Platform Manipulation, January – June 2020, January 2021.
22
Shane Huntley, Updates about government-backed hacking and disinformation, Google Threat Analysis Group, May 2020.
[Accessed on 11 February 2021]
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
6
2.2 Instigators and Agents of disinformation
Anyone with a social media account can create and spread disinformation: governments, companies, other
interest groups, or individuals. When analysing the different actors responsible for disinformation, the
UNESCO Working Group on Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation makes a distinction
between those fabricating disinformation and those distributing content: the instigators (direct or indirect)
are those creating the content and the agents (‘influencers’, individuals, officials, groups, companies,
institutions) are those in charge of spreading the falsehoods
23
.
The most systemic threats to political processes and human rights arise from organised attempts to run
coordinated campaigns across multiple social media platforms. As indicated by Facebook’s exposure of
coordinated inauthentic behaviour, large disinformation campaigns are often linked with governments,
political parties and the military, and/or with consultancy firms working for those bodies
24
. When the
instigator or agent of disinformation is – or has the backing of – a foreign state it may be breaching the
public international law principle of non-intervention
25
. Experts consider that the principle of non-
intervention applies as much to a state’s cyber operations as it does to other state activities. Foreign
interference should be understood as the ‘coercive, deceptive and/or non-transparent effort to disrupt the
free formation and expression of individuals’ political will by a foreign state actor or its agents’
26
. Since
exposure of the role of Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) – considered a ‘troll farm’ spreading pro-
Kremlin propaganda online under fake identities – in US politics in 2016, concerns have grown over foreign
interference operations involving disinformation. Civil society monitoring indicates that an increasingly
assertive China has joined Russia in interfering in democratic processes abroad
27
. This includes interference
in elections through concerted disinformation campaigns, fostering democratic regression and promoting
‘authoritarian resurgence’
28
. An EEAS special report published in April 2020 noted that ‘state-backed
sources from various governments, including Russia and – to a lesser extent – China, have continued to
widely target conspiracy narratives and disinformation both at public audiences in the EU and the wider
neighbourhood’
29
.
2.3 Tools and tactics
Disinformation campaigns are becoming increasingly sophisticated and micro-targeted, through
marketing strategies that use people’s data to segment them into small groups, thus providing apparently
tailored content. The fact that content sharing has also moved from open to encrypted platforms
(WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and WeChat are in the top five social media platforms globally) makes it
more difficult to track disinformation.
23
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
24
Nathaniel Gleicher, Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior, Facebook, published on 8 July 2021. [Accessed on 11 February
2021]
25
Carolyn Dubay, A Refresher on the Principle of Non-Intervention, International Judicial Monitor, Spring Issue, 2014.
26
James Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Crafting A Disinformation Framework, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Future Threats Future Solutions series, n 2, September 2020
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/24/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-crafting-disinformation-framework-pub-82720
27
European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), Louder than words? Connecting the dots of European democracy support. 2019.
28
Larry Diamond, The Democratic Rollback. The Resurgence of the Predatory State, Foreign Affairs, 87(2), 2008, pp 36–48.
29
EU vs. Disinfo, EEAS SPECIAL REPORT UPDATE: SHORT ASSESSMENT OF NARRATIVES AND DISINFORMATION AROUND THE
COVID-19/CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC (UPDATED 2 – 22 APRIL), published on 24 April 2020. [Accessed on 11 February 2021]
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
7
Among the emerging tools available to spread disinformation are:
• Manufactured amplification (artificially boosting the reach of information by manipulating search
engine results, promoting hashtags or links on social media)
30
• Bots (social media accounts operated by computer programmes, designed to generate posts or
engage with social platforms’ content)
31
• Astroturf campaigns (masking the real sponsor of a message, giving the false impression that it comes
from genuine grass-roots activism)
• Impersonation of authoritative media, people or governments (through false websites and/or social
media accounts)
• Micro-targeting (using consumer data, especially on social media, to send different information to
different groups
32
. Even if micro-targeting is not necessarily illegal and may be equally used by those
spreading legitimate information, the scandal of Cambridge Analytica demonstrates that it poses a
serious risk regarding the spread of disinformation)
33
• ‘Deep-fakes’ (digitally altered or fabricated videos or audio)
34
There are different state-sponsored disinformation activities that can be considered harmful practices. In
2019, political parties or leaders in around 45 democratic countries used computational propaganda tools
by amassing fake followers to gain voter support; in 26 authoritarian states government entities used
computational propaganda as a tool for information control to suppress public opinion and press freedom
and discredit opposition voices and political dissent
35
.
Manipulation can also be achieved through online selective censorship (removing certain content from a
platform by governments’ demands or by platforms’ curation responses), hacking and sharing or
manipulating search engine results
36
.
In this acceleration of manipulation, deep-fake technology can be harmful because people cannot tell
whether content is genuine or false. Real voices can be manipulated to say things that were never said,
making citizens unable to decipher between fact and fiction. That is why deep-fake technology may pose
particular harm to democratic discourse and to national and individual security. When we can no longer
believe what we see, truth and trust are at risk. Even before entering the political scene, deep-fake
technology had already been used to fabricate pornographic content for criminal purposes, thereby
30
Sam Earle, Trolls, Bots and Fake News: The Mysterious World of Social Media Manipulation, Newsweek, published on 14 October
2017. [Accessed on 11 February 2021]
31
Earle, 2017.
32
Ghosh Dipayan, What Is Microtargeting and what is it doing in our politics, Internet Citizen, Harvard University, 2018.
33
Carole Cadwalladr, as told to Lee Glendinning, Exposing Cambridge Analytica: 'It's been exhausting, exhilarating, and slightly
terrifying, The Guardian, published on 29 September 2018. [Accessed on 11 February 2021]; and Dobber, Tom; Ronan Ó Fathaigh
and Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius,, The regulation of online political micro-targeting in Europe, Journal on internet regulation,
Vol. 8(4), 2019.
34
Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz and Rasto Kužel, Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity, International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, Working Paper, August 2019.
35
Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media
Manipulation, University of Oxford Working Paper 2019(3), 2019.
36
Judit Bayer, Natalija Bitiukova, Petra Bárd, Judit Szakács, Alberto Alemanno and Erik Uszkiewicz, ‘Disinformation and propaganda
– impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its Member States’, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the
Union (IPOL), European Parliament, 2019.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
8
posing a tangible human rights threat to women in particular
37
. The Brookings Institute notes that harmful
deep-fakes may impact democratic discourse in three ways
38
:
• Disinformative video and audio: citizens may believe and remember online disinformation, which can
be spread virally through social media.
• Exhaustion of critical thinking: if citizens are unable to know with certainty what news content is true
or false, this will exhaust their critical thinking skills leading to an inability to make informed political
decisions.
• The Liar’s Dividend: politicians will be able to deny responsibility by suggesting that a true audio or
video content is false, even if it is true (in the way that ‘fake news’ has become a way of deflecting media
reporting).
Technology is always one step ahead and brings about a near-future where ‘we will see the rise of
cognitive-emotional conflicts: long-term, tech-driven propaganda aimed at generating political and social
disruptions, influencing perceptions, and spreading deception’ (Pauwels, 2019: 16). Some studies are
already measuring the effects of deep-fakes on people’s political attitudes and proving how microtargeting
amplifies those effects
39
.
2.4 Motivations for disinformation
Research has identified a variety of motivations behind disinformation, including financial or political
interests, state actors’ agendas, trolling and disruption along with even the desire for fame
40
. In some cases,
distorted information does not always seek to convince, but rather to emphasise divisions and erode the
principles of shared trust that should unite societies
41
. Lies breed confusion and contribute to the ‘decay
of truth’
42
and to a clash of narratives. In other cases, disinformation can be a very powerful strategy built
on low-cost, low-risk but high-reward tactics in the hands of hostile actors, feeling less constrained by
ethical or legal principles and offering very effective influence techniques
43
. The proliferation of social
media has democratised the dissemination of such narratives and the high consumption of content
undercutting truthfulness creates the perfect environment for some states to innovate in the old playbook
of propaganda. Financial reward can also provide substantial motivation as almost USD 0.25 billion is spent
in advertising on disinformation sites each year
44
.
Hwang
45
identifies political, financial and reputational incentives. Firstly, political motivation to spread
disinformation can go from advancing certain political agendas (for instance, linking immigration with
criminality) to imposing a narrative that presents a better geopolitical image of certain other nations
(illiberal democracies as an opposite to failing western democracies). Secondly, economic motivation is
37
Madeline Brady, Deepfakes: a new disinformation threat? Democracy Reporting International, August 2020.
38
Alex Engler, Fighting deepfakes when detection fails, The Brookings Institute, Published on 24 November 2019. [Accessed on 11
February 2021].
39
Tom Dobbe, Nadia Metoui, Damian Trilling, Natali Helberger and Claes de Vreese, Do (Microtargeted) Deepfakes Have Real
Effects on Political Attitudes, The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol 26(1), 2021, pp 69-91.
40
Rebecca Lewis, and Alice Marwick, Taking the Red Pill: Ideological motivations for Spreading Online Disinformation, in
Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem, Annenberg School for Communication, December 2017.
41
Carme Colomina, Techno-multilateralism: The UN in the age of post-truth diplomacy, in Bargués, P., UN@75: Rethinking
multilateralism, CIDOB Report, vol.6, 2020.
42
Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich, Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in
American Public Life. RAND Corporation Research Reports, 2018.
43
James Pamment. The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Crafting A Disinformation Framework, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Future Threats Future Solutions series, n 2, September 2020.
44
Global Disinformation Index, The Quarter Billion Dollar Question: How is Disinformation Gaming Ad Tech?, September 2019.
45
Tim Hwang, ‘Digital disinformation: A primer’, Atlantic Council Eurasia Group, September 2017.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
9
linked with social platforms’ economic models that benefit from the ‘click-bait model’, hence attracting
users through content that is tempting, albeit false. Finally, reputational motivation has to do with the
penetration of social networks used in our daily lives. There is an increasing dependence on friends, family
or group endorsement
46
.
3 The impacts of disinformation and counter-disinformation
measures on human rights and democracy
'
…
technology would not advance democracy and human
rights for (and instead of) you'
Zygmunt Bauman in A Chronicle of Crisis: 2011-2016
Key takeaways:
• Online disinformation has an impact on human rights. It affects the right to freedom of thought and the
right to hold opinions without interference; the right to privacy; the right to freedom of expression; the
right to participate in public affairs and vote in elections.
• More broadly, disinformation diminishes the quality of democracy. It saps trust in democratic institutions,
distorts electoral processes and fosters incivility and polarisation online.
• While robust counter-disinformation is needed to protect democracy, it can itself undercut human rights
and democratic quality.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) offers protection to all people in all countries
worldwide, but is not legally binding. Conversely, Human Rights are also secured in a series of treaties, such
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which are legally binding, but do not cover all countries. According to
the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights, states have a duty to protect their population against human
rights violations caused by third parties (Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’
Framework, 2011, Foundational Principles 1). In addition, businesses are required to respect human rights
in their activities (Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 2011,
Foundational Principles 11).
This chapter explains the different ways in which disinformation infringes human rights and menaces the
quality of democratic practice. It unpacks precisely which human rights are endangered by disinformation
and which aspects of broader democratic norms it undermines. The chapter then points to an issue that is
of crucial importance for EU actions on this issue in third countries: while disinformation threatens human
rights, the inverse challenge is that counter-disinformation policies can also restrict freedoms and rights.
46
Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy
making, Council of Europe report DGI(2017)09, 2017.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
10
3.1 Impacts on human rights
Freedom of expression is a core value for democracies (Article 19(2) of ICCPR). This includes press freedom
and the right to access information. Under human rights law, even the expression of false content is
protected, albeit with some exceptions.
Digitalisation and global access to social networks have created a new set of channels for the violation of
human rights, which the UN Human Rights Council confirms must apply as much online as they do offline
47
.
Digitalisation has amplified citizens’ vulnerability to hate speech and disinformation, enhancing the
capacity of state and non-state actors to undermine freedom of expression. Looking more closely at various
levels of impact, disinformation threatens a number of human rights and elements of democratic politics
48
.
3.1.1 Right to freedom of thought and the right to hold opinions without
interference
Article 19 of the UDHR states:
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.’
Article 19 of ICCPR states:
‘1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.’
In its 2011 General Comment on Article 19 ICCPR, which covers both freedom of opinion and freedom of
expression, the UN Human Rights Committee proclaims that: ‘Freedom of opinion and freedom of
expression are indispensable conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential for any
society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society’. Freedom of thought
entails a right not to have one’s opinion unknowingly manipulated or involuntarily influenced. It is not yet
clear where the dividing line is between legitimate political persuasion and illegitimate manipulation of
thoughts, but influence campaigns may well breach this right.
3.1.2 The right to privacy
Article 17 of ICCPR states:
‘1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
47
UN Human Rights Council Resolutions (2012-2018), The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet,
UN Doc A/HRC/RES/38/7 (5 July 2018), A/HRC/RES/32/13 (1 July 2016), A/HRC/RES/26/13 (26 June 2014), A/HRC/RES/20/8 (5 July
2012).
48
Kate Jones (2019) disaggregates the impact of online disinformation on human rights in the political context. She identifies
concerns with respect to five key rights: right to freedom of thought and the right to hold opinions without interference; the right
to privacy; the right to freedom of expression; the right to participate in public affairs and vote in elections.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
11
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’
Article 12 of UDHR stipulates that: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.’
The use of disinformation can interfere with privacy rights in two ways: by damaging the individual
reputation and privacy of the person it concerns in certain circumstances, and by failing to respect the
privacy of individuals in its target audience. The Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy states that
‘privacy infringements happen in multiple, interrelated and recurring forms facilitated by digital
technologies, in both private and public settings across physical and national boundaries’
49
. Online privacy
infringements extend offline privacy infringements. Digital technologies amplify their scope and intensify
their impact.
The right to privacy in the digital age is exposed to a new level of vulnerabilities, ranging from personal
attacks through social media to the harvesting and use of personal data online for micro-targeting
messages. However, as the case Tamiz v the United Kingdom showed
50
there is a thin line between freedom
of expression and the right to privacy. In that particular case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
reinforced the protection of freedom of expression by confirming a UK Court decision to reject the libel
claim of a British politician against Google Inc. because it hosted a blog which published insulting
comments against him.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has affirmed that there is ‘a growing global
consensus on minimum standards that should govern the processing of personal data by States, business
enterprises and other private actors’
51
. These minimum standards should guarantee that the ‘processing
of personal data should be fair, lawful and transparent in order to protect citizens from being targeted by
disinformation that can for instance cause harm to individual reputations and privacy’, even to the point
of inciting ‘violence, discrimination or hostility against identifiable groups in society’. In this context, the
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is founded on the right to protection of personal data in EU
law. The GDPR imposes controls on the processing of personal data, requiring that data be processed
lawfully, fairly and transparently.
3.1.3 The right to freedom of expression
The UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in Article 19, protect the
right to freedom of expression (see full quotation above, under Section 3.1.1).
The right to disseminate and access information is not limited to true information. In March 2017, a joint
declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of
American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on
Human and Peoples all stressed that ‘the human right to impart information and ideas is not limited to
‘correct’ statements, that the right also protects information and ideas that may shock, offend and disturb’
52
. They declared themselves alarmed both ‘at instances in which public authorities denigrate, intimidate
and threaten the media’, as well as others stating that the media is ‘the opposition' or is ‘lying’ and has a
hidden political agenda’. They further warned that ‘general prohibitions on the dissemination of
49
OHCHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy for the 43th session of the Human Rights Council, February
2020.
50
Tamiz v the United Kingdom (Application no. 3877/14) [2017] ECHR (12 October 2017), seen in European Court of Human Rights
upholds the right to freedom of expression on the Internet, Human Rights Law Centre, 2017 [Accessed on 28/02/21]
51
OHCHR, The right to privacy in the digital age, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 39
th
session of the Human Rights Council, August 2018.
52
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Joint declaration on freedom of expression and ‘fake news’,
disinformation and propaganda, March 2017.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
12
information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including ‘false news’ or ‘non-objective information’,
are incompatible with international standards for restrictions on freedom of expression [...] and should be
abolished’.
In April 2020, the same signatories were parties to a new ‘Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and
Elections in the Digital Age’, in which they expressed ‘grave concern’ about the threats and violent attacks
that journalists may face during elections, adding that targeted smear campaigns against journalists,
especially female journalists, undermine their work as well as public trust and confidence in journalism.
The agreed text not only calls for protecting freedom of expression, but also points at political authorities
passing laws limiting rights, restricting Internet freedom or ‘abusing their positions to bias media coverage,
whether on the part of publicly-owned or private media, or to disseminate propaganda
53
that may
influence election outcomes’. The signatories put forward a reminder that the states’ obligation to respect
and protect freedom of expression is especially pronounced in relation to female journalists and
individuals belonging to marginalised groups
54
.
3.1.4 Economic, social and cultural rights
Disinformation impacts not only the political sphere, but also economic, social and cultural aspects of life,
from personal mindsets about vaccinations to disavowing cultures or different opinions. Disinformation
feeds polarisation and erodes trust both within institutions and amongst communities. Such manipulation
tactics can damage personal rights to health and education, participation in cultural life and membership
of a community.
There are several economic, social and cultural rights that can be disrupted by disinformation, such as
those included in Article 25(1) UDHR: ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’.
Article 12 of the ICESCR affirms:
‘1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’
The most prominent recent example relates to disinformation around COVID-19, which has distorted
freedom of choice even within a health context (see also Chapter 4 on COVID-19). Blackbird
55
, an
organisation whose purpose it is to enhance decision making and empower the pursuit of information
integrity’
56
, released studies analysing the volume of disinformation generated on Twitter as a result of the
COVID-19 outbreak. In one of its reports
57
, Blackbird identified one of the disinformation campaigns
unfolding in Twitter as ‘Dem Panic’, which had the goal of de-legitimising the Democratic Party in the US
for their early warnings about the coronavirus and the need to introduce preventative measures.
Downplaying effects of the virus can clearly have negative impacts on public health. The Lancet warned in
October 2020 that the anti-vaccine movement together with digital platforms are becoming wealthier by
hosting and spreading disinformation campaigns in social media
58
. It is claimed that ‘anti-vaxxers have
53
In Article 20(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the term propaganda ‘refers to the
conscious effort to mould the minds of men [sic] so as to produce a given effect’ (Whitton, 1949; via Jones, 2019).
54
OSCE, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age, April 2020.
55
Blackbird AI, Disinformation reports, 2020.
56
The founders of this organisation ‘believe that disinformation is one of the greatest global threats of our time impacting national
security, enterprise businesses and the general public’. Accordingly, their ‘mission is to expose those that seek to manipulate and
divide’.
57
Blackbird AI, COVID-19 Disinformation Report – Vol. 2, March 2020.
58
Center for Countering Digital Hate, The Anti-vaxx industry. How Big-Tech powers and profits from vaccine misinformation’ in T.
Burki, The online anti-vaccine movement in the age of COVID-19, The Lancet, Vol. 2, October 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
13
increased their following by at least 7·8 million people since 2019’ and hence ‘the anti-vaccine movement
could realise USD 1 billion in annual revenues for social media firms’.
3.2 Impact on democratic processes
3.2.1 Weakening of trust in democratic institutions and society
Disinformation has an impact on the basic health and credibility of democratic processes. This has become
the core of recent positions taken by international organisations, such as Resolution 2326 (2020) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) expressing concern ‘about the scale of
information pollution in a digitally connected and increasingly polarised world, the spread of
disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping public opinion, trends of foreign electoral interference and
manipulation’
59
. Information and shared narratives are a precondition for good quality democratic public
discourse.
In this context, the European Parliament views disinformation as an ‘increasing systematic pressure’ on
European societies and their electoral stability
60
. The European Commission’s strategy Shaping Europe’s
Digital Future
61
considers that ‘disinformation erodes trust in institutions along with digital and traditional
media and harms our democracies by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed decisions’. It also
warns that disinformation is set to polarise democratic societies by creating or deepening tensions and
undermining democratic pillars such as electoral systems.
There are a number of ways in which disinformation weakens democratic institutions. These include the
use of social media to channel disinformation in coordinated ways so as to undermine institutions’
credibility. As trust in mainstream media has plummeted
62
, alternative news ecosystems have flourished.
Online platforms’ business model pushes content that generates clicks and this has increased polarisation.
This favours the creation of more homogeneous audiences, undercuts tolerance for alternative views
63
.
Figure 2 below suggests that around 80 % of people believe that disinformation has negative impacts in
their own countries’ politics, in other countries’ politics and in political discussions among families and
friends, which increases polarisation.
Surveys also show that disinformation can sow distrust in different pillars of democratic institutions,
including public institutions such as governments, parliaments and courts or their processes, public
figures, as well as journalists and free media
64
. For example, a survey undertaken by Ipsos Public Affairs and
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) reports that, due to the spread of disinformation,
many citizens have less trust in media (40 %) and government (22 %)
65
.
59
PACE, Democracy Hacked? How to Respond?, Resolution 2326 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 31
January 2020 (9
th
Sitting), January 2020.
60
European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract
propaganda against it by third parties, P8_TA(2016)0441, November 2016.
61
European Commission, Tackling online disinformation, webpage. [Accessed on 15 October 2020]
62
Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, Anne Schulz, Simge Andi and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020.
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2020.
63
Massimo Flore, Understanding Citizen’s Vulnerabilities: form Disinformation to Hostile Narratives, JRC Technical Report, European
Commission, 2020.
64
IPSOS Public Affairs and Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Internet security and trust, CIGI IPSOS Global
Survey 2019, Vol 3, 2019.
65
IPSOS and CIGI, 2019, p 138.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
14
Figure 2. The Political Impacts of Disinformation
66
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on CIGI-Ipsos, 2019 CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust., 2019; CIGI-IPSOS,
Internet security and Trust. Part 3, 2019.
3.2.2 The right to participate in public affairs and election interference
Article 21 of the UDHR states:
‘1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives’;
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’
Article 25 of the ICCPR defends that:
‘Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2
and without unreasonable restrictions:
• To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
• To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
• To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.’
According to the UN Human Rights Committee, states are obliged to ensure that ‘Voters should be able to
form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or
66
The percentage refers to people interviewed in 25 different countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa,
Republic of Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States) accounting for 1.000+ individuals in each
country during December 2018 and February 2019. See the original source (IPSOS-CIGI, 2019) for more information about the
methodology.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
15
manipulative interference of any kind’
67
. Election interference can be defined as unjustified and illegitimate
ways of influencing people’s minds and voters’choices, thereby reducing citizens’ abilities to exercise their
political rights
68
. This means that the right to vote has to be exercised without interference with freedoms
of thought and opinion, with the right to privacy and without hate speech. Many governments’ use of
disinformation contradicts this injunction. Even where they are not directly using disinformation in
electoral campaigns, other states may be falling short in protecting this right on behalf of their citizens.
Foreign states and non-state actors are also able to influence and undermine elections through digital
disinformation
69
. Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) purchased around 3 400 advertisements on
Facebook and Instagram during the US 2016 election campaign and, according to a 2019 Report ‘Russian-
linked accounts reached 126 million people on Facebook, at least 20 million users on Instagram, 1.4 million
users on Twitter, and uploaded over 1.000 videos to YouTube’
70
.
Whether or not successful, manipulating elections by affecting voters’ opinions and choices through
disinformation damages democracy and creates a trail of doubt as to whether democratic institutions
actually work well in reflecting citizens’ choices.
3.3 Digital violence and repression
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR states that:
‘2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.’
Disinformation is associated with a rise in more dramatic and grave digital violence. Digital violence has
been defined as using mobile phones, computers, video cameras and similar electronic devices with
intention to frighten, insult, humiliate or hurt a person in some other way
71
. The term ‘cyber-violence’,
includes a range of controlling and coercive behaviours, such as cyber-stalking, harassment on social
media sites, or the dissemination of intimate images without consent. Here, the instigators of digital
violence can be state and non-state actors as well as private groups or individuals.
In this context, digital repression means the coercive use of information and communication technologies
by a state to exert control over not only potential, but also existing challenges and challengers. Digital
repression includes an assortment of tactics through which states can use digital technologies to monitor
and restrict the actions of its citizens, including digital surveillance, advanced biometric monitoring,
disinformation campaigns and state-based hacking
72
. These actions self-evidently infringe core democratic
rights like the right to privacy and to freedom of expression.
In multiple political systems, cyber militias and ‘troll farms’ are used to drown out dissenting voices,
accusing them of spreading ‘fake news’ or being ‘enemies of the people’, a sort of censorship through
noise
73
. Experts warn against the practice of ‘state-sponsored trolling’, which consists of governments
67
UN Committee on Human Rights, General Comment 25, ‘The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to
Equal Access to Public Service’, 1510
th
meeting (fifty-seventh session), 12 July 1996.
68
UNHR, ‘Monitoring Human Rights in the Context of Elections’, in Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, chapter 23, 2011.
69
Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, and Arthur Nelson, Beyond the Ballot: How the Kremlin Works to Undermine the U.S. Justice
System, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2019.
70
Robert Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, U.S. Department of Justice,
March 2019.
71
Dragan Popadic Dragan and Dobrinka Kuzmanovic, Utilisation of Digital Technologies, Risks, and Incidence of Digital Violence
among students in Serbia. Unicef Report, 2013.
72
Steven Feldstein, How Artificial Intelligence Is Reshaping Repression, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 30, 2019, pp 40-52.
73
Peter Pomerantsev, ‘Human rights in the age of disinformation’, Unherd, published on 8 July 2020. [Accessed on 15 August 2020]
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
16
creating online content to attack opposition and discredit critical voices of dissent, thereby cutting across
basic standards of democratic debate which should be open and pluralistic.
While this study’s remit is limited to legal content, current disinformation challenges cannot be divorced
from the concept of ‘hate speech’, commonly referring to any communication that disparages a person or
a group on the basis of some characteristic such as race, colour, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
nationality, religion, or other characteristic. Disinformation can be an important part of this. Incitement to
hatred and discrimination (without advocacy of violence) is illegal in many EU Member States, unlike in the
United States. To address this challenge, in May 2016 the European Commission agreed with Facebook,
Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube, on a Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online
74
.
Coordinated online hate speech against racial and ethnic minorities has led to violence in different places
and disinformation has been used to attack minorities and human rights defenders around the world
75
.
For
instance: in Sri Lanka and Malaysia targeted disinformation resulted in an outburst of violence against
Muslims; in Myanmar, the military used Facebook to incite violence against the Rohingya; and rumours
about Muslims in India circulating on WhatsApp have resulted in lynchings
76
.
3.4 Counter-disinformation risks
Disrupting human rights and democracy by disinformation is clearly of serious concern. However, there is
another side to the democratic equation, namely that action against disinformation also carries risks.
Tackling disinformation through a human rights prism involves difficult trade-offs and delicate policy
balances. Disinformation itself threatens to produce core breaches in human rights. Hence, countering
disinformation is an important contribution in efforts to safeguard global human rights. Yet, countering
disinformation can also itself constrict human rights. Even if disinformation can easily damage human
rights, both within the EU and at international level, the legal and political abuse of what has been labelled
the ‘fight against fake news’ has in some countries also resulted in reduced freedom of expression and
political dissent. This is becoming a more serious problem both inside and outside the European Union
77
.
Consequently, in defending measures to tackle disinformation, the European Union must be careful to
tackle both human rights impacts resulting from disinformation and any rights abuses inadvertently
caused by attempts to counter disinformation in such a way that does not encourage third-country
governments’ human rights breaches. Erosion of rights can be caused, for instance, by: government
interferences with internet services; state censorship or restrictions to online speech; and obstacles to the
proper functioning of media outlets. Any actions – be they legal, administrative, extra-legal or political –
which have the potential to breach freedoms of expression, assembly and association, will ultimately result
in an erosion of the democratic space
78
.
74
European Commission, Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, June 2016.
75
Interview with and MEP from the GUE-NGL group, 29 October 2020.
76
Timothy McLaughlin, ‘How WhatsApp Fuels Fake News and Violence in India,’ Wired, Published on 12 December 2018; Vindu
Goel, Suhasini Raj and Priyadarshini Ravichandran, ‘How WhatsApp Leads Mobs to Murder in India,’ New York Times, published on
18 July 2018. [Accessed on 15 August 2020]
77
ARTICLE 19, Responding to ‘Hate Speech’: Comparative Overview of Six EU Countries, 2018.
78
European Partnership for Democracy in collaboration with the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Thinking
democratically: recommendations for responding to the phenomenon of ‘shrinking space’., EPD Report, 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
17
There is also a risk that the activities of the digital platforms in combating disinformation may restrict
freedom of expression. In two reports published in 2018
79
and 2019
80
, the former UN Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression David Kaye warned against regulation that entrusts platforms with even more
powers to decide on content removals without public oversight. As moves towards platform regulation
are developing within the EU, similar regulatory updates are now under discussion in the United States.
Awareness about dangers associated with using counter-disinformation techniques which could
inadvertently compromise rights has also grown in the UN. In December 2019, a Russian-led and Chinese-
backed resolution on cybercrime entitled ‘Countering the use of information and communications
technologies for criminal purposes’, was adopted by 79 votes to 60 with 33 abstentions, despite opposition
from several major Western powers
81
. Opponents of the text feared that the resolution would serve to
erode freedom of expression online. It sought to make advances in the ‘fighting of cybercrime’ through
information control and the suppression of political dissidents. Votes in favour were cast by countries such
as Cambodia, North Korea, Burma, Venezuela, Algeria, Syria, Belarus and Kazakhstan. All EU member states,
Canada, Australia and the United States voted against. As geopolitical debates about cybersecurity have
deepened, it is increasingly apparent that human rights risk becoming a casualty of both disinformation
and counter-disinformation agendas.
79
UN Special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, ‘Report on Artificial
Intelligence technologies and implications for freedom of expression and the information environment’, to the General Assembly,
73rd session, 29 August 2018.
80
UN Special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression on ‘Surveillance and human rights, to the, 41
st
session
Human Rights Council, 24 June-12 July 2019.
81
Carme Colomina, Techno-multilateralism: The UN in the age of post-truth diplomacy, in Bargués, P., UN@75: Rethinking
multilateralism, CIDOB Report, vol.6, 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
18
4 The impact of disinformation during the COVID-19 crisis
‘As COVID-19 spreads, a tsunami of misinformation, hate,
scapegoating and scare-mongering has been unleashed’
Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General
Key takeaways
• The COVID-19 infodemic has led to a spike in ‘fake news’ about hoaxes, pseudoscience and conspiracy
theories, thereby breeding distrust in public institutions and putting lives at risk.
• Most of the disinformation spread during the COVID-19 crisis has been reconfigured content, false or
misleading, coming from prominent public figures.
• The pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing trends of foreign interference but has also unleashed new
dynamics. In this acceleration of disinformation, tech companies have become more powerful in
shaping public opinion but also political actors with an essential responsibility in the global responses
to disinformation.
• Some regulations targeting disinformation during the pandemic have involved new limits on press
freedom and censorship tools that are likely to persist beyond the COVID-19 crisis.
The COVID-19 pandemic has forced the EU to adapt its external policies so as to counter evolving threats
and online manipulation
82
. During this time of uncertainty, there has been an increase in information
consumption. This has led to data overexposure, a spike in ‘fake news’, hoaxes, pseudoscience and
conspiracy theories, breeding distrust in public institutions. The World Health Organisation (WHO) noted
that global citizens were victims of both the pandemic itself and an ‘infodemic’ that arose around it. It
launched a pilot programme called EPI-WIN
83
, the Information Network for Epidemics, to combat
misinformation.
Between 20 January and 10 February 2020, two million messages posted on Twitter – 7 % of the total –
spread conspiracy theories about the coronavirus. Amidst the need for information and reliable sources,
an increased awareness of the vulnerability caused by disinformation arose. According to Reporters
Without Borders, as many as 74 % of Internet users expressed their concern about ‘fake news’ on social
media
84
. This overload of unreliable information spread rapidly among the population, making it hard for
people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance just when they needed it most. Disinformation
put lives at risk as it led people to ignore official health advice and engage in risky behaviour. In
Madagascar, for instance, president Andry Rajoelina showed his support for an unproven herbal tea to cure
COVID-19
85
. Just one month earlier, US president Donald Trump suggested that disinfectant could kill the
virus
86
. As the Reuters Institute pointed out, politicians, celebrities and other prominent public figures were
82
European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Europan Council, the Council, The European
Economic and Social Commitee and the Committee of the Regions. Tackling COVID-19 disinformation - Getting the facts right,
JOIN(2020) 8 final, June 2020.
83
See WHO EPI-WIN webpage.
84
See Reporters without Borders Tracker-19 webpage.
85
Arin Baker, ‘Could It Work as a Cure? Maybe.' A Herbal Remedy for Coronavirus Is a Hit in Africa, But Experts Have Their Doubt,
TIME, published on 22 May 2020.
86
Clark Dartunorro, Trump suggests 'injection' of disinfectant to beat coronavirus and 'clean' the lungs, NBC news, published on 24
April 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
19
conspicuous in spreading misinformation online during the pandemic. One research survey revealed that
falsehoods coming from presidents, opinion-makers and global public figures represented 20 % of total
misinformation, accounting for 69 % of such actions on social media
87
.
Fact-checking organisations in Africa report to have debunked more than 1 000 of such misleading reports
since the pandemic’s onset
88
. COVID-19 disinformation has recycled pre-existing conspiracy theories and
harmful medical practices. According to a Reuters Institute research survey
89
, 87 % of online disinformation
on the pandemic spread between January and March 2020 used reconfigured content, impersonated
genuine sources or updated longstanding conspiracy theories.
Table 2. COVID-19 Information Disorder
(Identified by international fact-checkers between January and March 2020
90
)
Types
Contents
Scope
Reconfiguration
• ‘Misleading content’ containing some
true information, but the details were
reformulated, selected and re-
contextualised in ways that made them
false or misleading
•
Imposter Content: when genuine
sources are impersonated
• Images or videos labelled or described
as being somethin
g other than what
they are
• Conspiracy theories
59 % of disinformative content identified
91
Completely
fabricated
New content 100 % false, designed to
deceive and do harm
38 % of disinformative content identified
92
Satire/Parody
No intention to cause harm, but with
potential to fool
3 % of the misinformative content identified
93
Monetised
disinformation
Content that potentially capitalises on
promoting or advocating for harmful health
or medical claims or practices.
IBM
’
s X-Force Threat Intelligence identified in
March a 6 000 % increase in COVID-19 related
spam, compared to the year before.
From January to August 2020,Google blocked or
removed over 82.5 million COVID-19 related ads,
suspended more than 1 300 accounts from EU-
based advertisers.
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Brennen et al., Types, Sources and Claims of COVID-19 Misinformation, Reuters Institute and
Google, EU & COVID-19 Disinformation Google Report, September 2020’.
87
Scott J. Brennen, Felix Simon, Philip N. Howard, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. Types, Sources, and Claims of COVID-19 Misinformation,
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, April 2020.
88
WHO, Landmark alliance launches in Africa to fight COVID-19 misinformation, WHO Africa, published on 3 December 2020.
89
This Reuters Institute research analysed 225 pieces of misinformation sampled from a corpus of English-language fact-checks
gathered by First Draft, focusing on content rated false or misleading. See S. Brennen et al., 2020.
90
S. Brennen et al., 2020.
91
S. Brennen et al., 2020.
92
S. Brennen et al., 2020.
93
S. Brennen et al., 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
20
During the pandemic, social media acted as a double-edged sword
94
. On the one hand, digital platforms
were useful in promoting debate within the scientific community and disseminating valuable information
as well as investigative results. On the other hand, they also helped disseminate flawed studies and
misinformation. Even if the pandemic has strengthened the pressure of accountability on big tech
companies, their capacity to filter information has been much weaker than their impact on the circulation
of content. However, in the framework of the Code of Practice agreed between the European Commission
and big tech companies, there have been monthly reports on the actions undertaken by these platforms
to tackle COVID-19-related disinformation
95
. Social media platforms were also asked to collaborate with
the UN system to prevent the spread of disinformation. A team of WHO ‘myth-busters’ worked with search
and media companies such as Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Tencent, Twitter, TikTok, YouTube and others
to counter the spread of lies about the pandemic
96
. In December 2020, the WHO launched its Africa
Infodemic Response Alliance to coordinate the actions of international organisations, governments and fact-
checkers to tackle disinformation on COVID-19
97
.
Social networks' policies of content control have been strengthened to some degree. For instance, Twitter
reported that it had removed 20 000 tweets, challenged 8.5 million accounts and has the capacity to detect
92 % of content which violates Twitter’s rules and policies.
98
Microsoft centred its efforts on making sure
that searches about coronavirus would end at authoritative webpages with trustworthy information.
Facebook promised to use ‘strong warning labels’ tagging disinformation that they removed, for instance,
a post by Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro claiming that hydroxychloroquine was a remedy for COVID-19.
Instagram filtered and removed COVID-19 related content that was not posted by official health
organisations.
However, such advances remain insufficient. The Oxford Internet Institute shows that Facebook’s content
moderating policies have detected less than 1 % of videos with ‘disinformative’ content about the virus
99
.
An Avaaz report published in August 2020 pointed out that only 16 % of all health misinformation
analysed had a warning label from Facebook. Despite their content being fact-checked by Avaaz, the
other 84 % of articles and posts sampled remained online without warnings.
100
One of the reasons for this
failure lies in the possibilities for cross-sharing between different social networks
101
that make traceability
more difficult.
As Europol states
102
, coordinated disinformation campaigns can feed distrust in the ability of democratic
institutions to deliver effective responses to the current health crisis
103
. Subsequently, criminal
organisations as well as state and state-backed actors have sought to exploit the public health crisis to
advance their interests. According to Lea Gabrielle, Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global
Engagement Centre at the US State Department, countries such as China, Russia and Iran have sharply
94
Carlos Chaccour and Rafael Vilasanjuan, Infodemic: has the epidemic of misinformation affected the response to COVID-19?v,
ISGlobal, Barcelona Institute for Global Health, September 2020.
95
European Commission, Shaping Europe’s digital future, Fourth set of reports – Fighting COVID-19 disinformation Monitoring
Programme, December, 2020.
96
See WHO Mythbusters webpage.
97
Scott J. Brennen, Felix Simon, Philip N. Howard, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. Types, Sources, and Claims of COVID-19 Misinformation,
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, April 2020.
98
S. Brennen et al., 2020.
99
Aleksi Knuutila, Aliaksandr Herasimenka, Hubert Au, Jonathan Bright and Philip N. Howard, The Spread of Misinformation Videos
on Social Media and the Effectiveness of Platform Policies, Oxford Internet Institute, September 2020.
100
Avaaz, 'Facebook's Algorithm: A Major Threat to Public Health', Avaaz Report, August 2020.
101
EU Disinfo Lab, Hydroxychloroquine and Facebook: The Challenge of Moderating Scientifically Debatable Claims. Published on
27 October 2020 [Accessed 07 January 2021]
102
EUROPOL, Catching the virus cybercrime, disinformation and the COVID-19 pandemic, April 2020.
103
EUROPOL, 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
21
increased their dissemination of disinformation about the coronavirus since January 2020, repeating and
amplifying one another’s propaganda and falsehoods
104
. Conspiracy theories spun about false remedies
and dark origins in the manufacture of the virus, incited attacks on 5G telecommunications masts in Europe
and fuelled anti-Asian racism
105
.
4.1 Acceleration of existing trends
Disinformation about the pandemic has become a global phenomenon. Acceleration of the digitalisation
process, together with hyper-connectivity and Internet penetration capacity have amplified effects of what
the EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell, called the ‘global battle of
narratives’
106
. Examples gathered by the Oxford Internet Institute show how Russian and Iranian outlets
generated polarising content in Spanish to target Latin America and Spanish-speaking social media users
in the United States
107
. Furthermore, numerous Chinese state-backed outlets targeted non-English
audiences across the globe to support China’s soft power ambitions. For instance, China launched a CGTN
Español channel, targeting Spanish-speaking countries – especially in Latin America and the Caribbean
where China has economic, political and cultural interests. Meanwhile, Iran had also launched a Latin
American-focused channel with HispanTV in 2012. This channel represents the Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcaster’s (IRIB) attempt to establish stronger connections with their allies in Latin America and
counterbalance Western media. These channels were increasingly used during the pandemic, causing a
surge in the level of disinformation challenging Latin American democracies and affecting efforts to fight
COVID-19
108
. Finally, Turkey has also shown recent interest in Arabic, Spanish and German-speaking
audiences, within the context of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s use of soft power tools to bolster his
country’s global reputation.
4.2 The impact of the COVID-19 infodemia on Human Rights
The COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ has demonstrated how disinformation may prevent individuals from realising
their right to health, given legal force through Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The impact of disinformation, particularly at a time of uncertainty around the
pandemic and a hunger for information, is that individuals may fail to follow the guidance of science and
authority in accessing the health care and medicines they need, in participating in measures necessary to
combat the pandemic and in having vaccines that may protect them and their societies from further
disease. ‘Without the appropriate trust and correct information, diagnostic tests go unused, immunisation
campaigns (or campaigns to promote effective vaccines) will not meet their targets and the virus will
continue to thrive’
109
.
104
Special envoy and coordinator of the Global Engagement Center at the US State Department, Lea Gabrielle, hearing before the
subcommittee on State Department and USAID management, international operations, and bilateral international development
of the committee on Foreign Relations. US Senate, 5 March 2020. Available here.
105
Thomas, Seal, 5G Virus Conspiracy Theory Drives Phone Mast Attacks in UK, Bloomberg, published on 6 April 2020. [Accessed 10
October 2020]
106
EEAS, The Coronavirus pandemic and the new world it is creating, published on 23 March 2020. [Accessed 10 October 2020]
107
Katarina Rebello, Christian Schwieter, Marcel Schliebs, Kate Joynes-Burgess, Mona Elswah, Jonathan Bright & Philip N. Howard.
COVID-19 News and Information from State-Backed Outlets Targeting French, German and Spanish-Speaking Social Media Users
,
University of Oxford - Oxford Internet Institute, June 2020.
108
Tom Philips, David Agren, Dan Collyns and Uki Goñi, ‘Tsunami of fake news hurts Latin America’s effort to fight coronavirus’, The
Guardian, 26 July 2020.
109
Joint statement by WHO, UN, UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, UNAIDS, ITU, UN Global Pulse, and IFRC, Managing the COVID-19
infodemic: Promoting healthy behaviours and mitigating the harm from misinformation and disinformation, September 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
22
As noted previously, in responding to the COVID-19 outbreak, at least 17 governments have enforced
regulations targeting disinformation during the pandemic which involve new censorship
110
. The
International Press Institute Information's COVID-19 tracker has been monitoring press freedom
restrictions, warning that they may outlast the pandemic
111
.
According to the International Observatory of Human Rights, many governments ’have cracked down hard
on media outlets and journalists' trying to provide accurate information and facts. This London-based NGO
gathered a long list of rights violations, allegedly triggered by the emergency resulting from the fight
against this pandemic. In Iran, the government has imposed sweeping restrictions on journalistic coverage
as part of a systematic effort to downplay the scope of this public health crisis. Similarly, Egypt has
pressured journalists to understate the number of infections and forced a Guardian journalist to leave the
country after she reported on a scientific study which stated that Egypt was likely to have many more
coronavirus cases than have been officially confirmed
112
. Turkey has launched legal proceedings against
316 social media users, charging them with inciting hatred and enmity by spreading concern about COVID-
19
113
. In Russia, the state media regulator, Roskomnadzor, ordered two media outlets to remove COVID-19
reports from their websites and social media
114
. The regulator also published a warning that it would take
punitive measures against the ‘dissemination of false information’ and attempts to ‘sow panic among the
public and provoke public disturbance’. All this exemplifies a violation of the right to information and a
free press.
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has denounced China’s coronavirus disinformation campaign which was
designed to drown out critics who blame Beijing for the virus’ spread. Chinese officials have gone so far as
to suggest that it might have been the US army that ‘brought the epidemic to Wuhan’ or that the
coronavirus might have been ‘circulating in parts of Italy before doctors were aware of the outbreak in
China’
115
. As a further example, the government in Honduras responded to the outbreak by suspending a
clause in its constitution that prohibits censorship and protects the right to free expression.
110
I
nternational Press Institute, Rush to pass 'fake news' laws during COVID-19 intensifying global media freedom challenges,
October 2020.
111
See IPI COVID-19 Media Freedom Monitor
.
112
Michael Safi, Egypt forces Guardian journalist to leave after coronavirus story, The Guardian, Published on 26 March 2020.
[Accessed 10 October 2020]
113
EU vs. Disinfo, EEAS SPECIAL REPORT UPDATE: SHORT ASSESSMENT OF NARRATIVES AND DISINFORMATION AROUND THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC , April 2020.
114
Alexander Avilov, Russian News Outlets Ordered to Take Down ‘Fake’ Coronavirus News, The Moscow Times, Published on 20
March 2020. [Accessed 10 October 2020]
115
Reporters Without Borders, Beware of China’s coronavirus disinformation, RSF says, RWB News, published on 18 April 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
23
5 Mapping responses: Legislative and regulatory bodies,
corporate activities and civil society
'What's disappeared from the internet isn't truth so much as trust'
Philip Seargent in The Art of Political Storytelling. Why stories
win votes in post-truth politics
Key takeaways
• Three groups of actors are involved in responses to disinformation: legislative and regulatory bodies,
private sector (digital platforms) and civil society. Certain responses target the actors deemed
responsible for disinformation; some target the disruptive techniques used; others aim at improving
citizens resilience to disinformation.
• Most of the actions taken by the largest social platforms are related to content curation. However, in
line with a broader concept of disinformation, digital platforms’ responsibility should not be narrowed
to the factuality of content spread, but to the complex structure that determines how content is
transmitted, including the business model that can enforce systemic biases.
• One of the main problems in holding social platforms accountable for the spread of disinformation is
how to determine who is responsible for the content posted.
• There is a risk with some of these responses of turning governments or private digital platforms into
arbiters of acceptable speech.
In taking measures to address the entire spectrum of disinformation responses, it is important to look at
the different actors involved, together with the typology of decisions and actions taken. Certain responses
target the actors deemed responsible for disinformation, some target the disruptive techniques used,
whilst others aim at improving citizens resilience to disinformation.
The UNESCO Working Group on Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation distinguishes four
top-level categories or responses to disinformation
116
:
• identification responses whose goal is to raise awareness on the deceptive content and the importance
of truth;
• responses aimed at producers and distributors, including legislative and regulatory decisions;
• responses aimed at production and distribution mechanisms, which involve the role of technological
platforms;
• and responses aimed at the targeted audiences of disinformation campaigns, in particular involving
measures to build resilience.
116
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
24
Table 3. Disinformation responses
Type of responses
Measures and actions
Actors involved
Identification responses
• Monitoring and fact-checking
responses
• Investigative responses
News organisations, internet
communication companies, academia,
civil society organisations and
independent fact-checking
organisations
Responses aimed at instigators,
agents and intermediaries
• Legislative, pre-legislative, and
policy responses (to deter
disinformation or affirm the right
of freedom of expression)
• National and international
counter-disinformation
campaigns
• Electoral responses (to protect
integrity and credibility of
elections, through measures that
detect, track, and counter
disinformation)
Legislative and regulatory bodies,
international organisations
This category of responses needs a
multi-dimensional approach involving
a combination of monitoring and fact-
checking, legal, curatorial and
technical actors.
Responses aimed at the
distribution mechanisms
•
Curatorial responses (editorial
and content policies and
‘community standards’)
• Technical and algorithmic
responses
• De-monetisation responses
Regulatory bodies and international
organisations (for instance, ensuring
privacy-preserving environments or
facilitating independent arbitration),
social platforms
Responses aimed at the target
audiences of disinformation
campaigns
• Ethical and normative responses
• Educational responses
• Empowerment and credibility
labelling efforts
• Support for a free and diverse
media
Regulatory bodies, international
organisations, academia and
education systems, news
organisations
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation
While Respecting Freedom of Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
25
From the point of view of actors involved, these responses could be divided into three groups: legislative
and regulatory bodies, the private sector (digital platforms) and civil society.
5.1 Legislative and regulatory bodies
Different political and regulatory traditions play a role in shaping responses to online disinformation. As
seen in previous sections, while some governments have been considering how to respond to
disinformation without damaging pluralism and human rights, others are using legislation against
disruptive content to limit freedoms. By March 2020, at least 28 countries had passed laws related to
disinformation, either updating existing regulations or passing new rulings. The scope of established
legislation varies from media and electoral laws to cybersecurity and penal codes
117
. The Poynter Institute
published a guide of anti-disinformation actions around the world, mapping the different responses
118
.
These range from bills to punish politicians nationwide for ‘the dissemination, promotion or financing of
false news’ – e.g. Chile in 2019 –, to China’s criminalisation of starting or spreading rumours that
‘undermine economic and social order’ in 2016
119
, media regulations facilitating a crackdown on journalism
– e.g. in Cameroon or Indonesia –, or cyber security laws, like those existing in Vietnam, requiring platforms
such as Facebook to delete content at the government’s request
120
.
Following a completely different approach, Canada and France, for instance, introduced laws to improve
tech platforms’ transparency on political advertising, requiring social media companies to create ad
repositories. However, while French legislation also enables its broadcasting agency to suspend or
terminate broadcasters under the influence of foreign states if they spread false information likely to
undermine electoral integrity, in Canada the government has created a non-partisan panel taking
decisions on disinformation independently
121
. In Uruguay, political parties signed an agreement proposed
by the national press association against disinformation during the elections of 2019
122
. The European
Union’s approach in this regard is presented in Chapter 6.
Beyond governmental actions, much has been undertaken by international organisations, not only in
establishing legislative frameworks but also in engaging with different initiatives. A selection of these
multilateral responses is presented below.
In 2018, the G7 established the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) following Canada’s initiative. The RRM
developed out of the Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracies from Foreign Threats
123
and aims
at coordinating information sharing and responses to ‘malign and evolving threats to G7 democracies’.
The RRM is not limited to disinformation, but also covers threats to democracy more generally. The RRM
is designed inter alia to: respond to foreign interference; share lessons and best practices that promote
‘free, independent and pluralistic media’, and freedom of expression; and engage with private actors to
better tackle ‘malicious misuse of information’.
117
K. Bontcheva and J. Posetti, 2020.
118
Daniel Funke and Daniela Flamini, A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world, Poynter, 2019.
119
Maria Repnikova, China’s Lessons for Fighting Fake News, Foreign Policy, Published on 6 September 2018.
120
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
121
Chris Tenove, Protecting democracy from disinformation: normative threats and policy responses, The International Journal of
Press/Politics, Vol 25(3), May 2020, pp 517-537
122
Silvia Higuera, Por iniciativa de asociación de periodistas, partidos políticos de Uruguay firmarán pacto contra la desinformación,
LatAm Journalism Review, Published on 24 April 2019.
123
Government of Canada, Charlevoix commitment on defending democracy from foreign threats, January 2019.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
26
On 13 February 2019, the Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe adopted a declaration on the
manipulative capabilities of algorithmic processes
124
, calling for more protection in respecting human
rights, given ‘significant impacts of the targeted use of data on societies and on the exercise of human
rights more broadly’.
In 2019, the report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation’s put forward
proposals to improve ‘global digital cooperation architecture’, providing some momentum for
developments at UN level. On 11 June 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres
presented a set of recommended actions for the international community to promote – inter alia – digital
trust and ensure the protection of human rights in the digital era
125
. These included the creation of digital
public goods to counter xenophobia and disinformation as well as advocacy for Digital Human Rights
that helps in dealing with the spread of disinformation.
During 2020, in the wake of disinformation campaigns surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the United
Nations launched the Verified initiative
126
to counter the spread of misleading information on the public
health crisis. This is a public-private partnership relying on individuals as trusted community messengers.
The UN and the WHO have also partnered with Facebook, WhatsApp and other messaging services to
deliver accurate information about the pandemic (see also chapter 4 above).
In January 2020, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) expressed concern ‘about the
scale of information pollution in a digitally connected and increasingly polarised world, the spread of
disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping public opinion, trends of foreign electoral interference and
manipulation, as well as abusive behaviour and the intensification of hate speech on the internet and social
media’
127
.
5.2 Corporate activities
Since the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 endorsed by consensus the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights, it has been widely accepted that companies have a non-binding ‘responsibility to
respect’ human rights
128
. The largest digital information platforms are now increasing their human rights
expertise and focus, particularly regarding freedom of expression, as they combat disinformation and
foreign interference. They are working with fact-checkers and have introduced increased transparency for
political advertisements. However, rules and procedures regrettably differ among platforms, leaving
loopholes for cross-platform disinformation campaigns
129
. Platforms lack transparency on how they collect
personal data, what they do with it or how their algorithms work, thus creating openings for micro-
targeting and disinformation.
Most actions taken by the largest social media platforms are related to content curation, as illustrated
below in Table 4. For instance, in 2019 Facebook employed 15 000 staff to deal with content moderation.
By contrast, WhatsApp for example uses end-to-end encryption, which in practice means that it cannot
access the contents of messages. There are also dedicated disinformation sites (e.g. Infowars, Q-Anon) that
do not apply these types of restrictions. Although content curation has been the most used measure,
124
Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on the manipulative capabilities of
algorithmic processes’, Decl(13/02/2019)1, 1337th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, February 2019.
125
United Nations, Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, June 2020.
126
See Verified webpage.
127
PACE, Democracy Hacked? How to Respond?, Resolution 2326 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 31
January 2020 (9
th
Sitting), January 2020.
128
UN OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, New York and Geneva: United Nations Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011.
129
Karen Kornbluh and Ellen P. Goodman, Safeguarding Digital Democracy. Digital Innovation and Democracy Initiative Roadmap,
The German Marshall Fund of the United States DIDI Roadmap n 4, March 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
27
digital platforms have also adopted other precautions to fight disinformation, such as working with fact-
checkers.
Table 4. Actions taken by online platforms
Facebook
•
Rules for political and issue advertisements: any advertiser who wants
to run political or issue ads must be verified on the platform and
include ‘paid for’ disclaimers with the advertising
130
.
• Applying machine-learning to assist their response teams in
detecting fraud and enforcing our policies against inauthentic spam
accounts
131
.
• Media literacy campaign launched with fact-checkers FullFact
132
.
Twitter
• Labelling or removing false or misleading information intended to
undermine public confidence in an election or other civic process
(misleading information, disputed claim, unverified claim)
133
.
YouTube
•
Removing content that has been technically manipulated or
doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken out of
context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm
134
.
• Terminate channels that attempt to impersonate another person or
channel, or artificially increase the number of views, likes and
comments on a video
135
.
Instagram
• Labelling content that has been rated as false or partly false by a
third-party fact-checker
136
.
• If something is flagged as false or partly false on Facebook, it is label
identical if it is posted on Instagram (and vice versa).
WhatsApp
• Limits on message forwarding
137
.
Ahead of the 2020 US elections, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Reddit, Verizon Media and the Wikimedia Foundation
joined Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft to coordinate with the US intelligence community in
identifying disinformation campaigns. This led to several ‘takedowns’ of coordinated inauthentic
behaviour, including the removal of a network linked to the Russian troll farm Internet Research Agency
(IRA) from Facebook
138
.
130
See: https://wearesculpt.com/blog/political-ads-on-facebook/
131
See: Facebook’s policies on Facebook news webpage.
132
FullFact, Report on the Facebook Third-Party Fact-Checking programme, December 2020.
133
See Twitter’s policies on Twitter webpage.
134
See Youtube’s policies on Youtube Help webpage
135
See Youtube Help webpage
136
See Instagram’s policies on Instagram’s webpage.
137
Alex, Hern, WhatsApp to impose new limit on forwarding to fight fake news, The Guardian, published on 7 April 2020.
138
Nimmo, Ben, Camille François, C Shawn Eib, Léa Ronzaud, IRA Again: Unlucky Thirteen. GRAPHIKA Report, September 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
28
The decision
139
of some of these digital platforms to silence President Donald Trump online presence
temporarily – and ultimately permanently in the case of Twitter – following the storming of the US Capitol
on 6 January 2021, raised new questions about limitations to freedom of expression and the role of social
networks as gatekeepers of disinformation.
However – as Figure 3 below shows –, according to an Ipsos poll private sector initiatives to counter
disinformation garner support from the majority of citizens.
Figure 3. Citizens’ support for different measures to tackle ‘fake news’ and disinformation
140
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on CIGI-Ipsos, 2019 CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey on Internet Security and Trust., 2019; CIGI-Ipsos,
Internet security and Trust. Part 3, 2019.
With regards to promoting and protecting the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the UN Special
Rapporteur has repeatedly called for alignment of digital platforms’ policies on content moderation with
freedom of expression standards
141
, given that transparency and accountability in relation to curatorial
actions are essential for protecting this right.
Digitalisation has brought about a profound redistribution of power, but this transformation has not been
accompanied by equally robust mechanisms for documenting responsibilities. For a long time, digital
platforms – along with other private entities – have been setting their own standards. One of the main
139
Sonnemaker, Tyler, ‘Facebook and Instagram have blocked Trump for 24 hours after the president published posts spouting
misinformation as his supporters violently stormed the US Capitol’, Insider, published on 7 January 2021. [Accessed 20 February
2021]:
140
The percentage refers to people interviewed in 25 different countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa,
Republic of Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States) accounting for 1.000+ individuals in each country during
December 2018 and February 2019. See the original source (IPSOS CIGI) for more information about the methodology.
141
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Promotion and
protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, UN Doc A/73/348, August 2018.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
29
problems in holding them accountable for the spread of disinformation is determining who is responsible
for the content posted.
The proposed EU Digital Services Act (see Chapter 6) tries to address this issue by requiring digital platforms
to address systemic risks by publishing annual risk assessments. Digital platforms will have to implement
measures to mitigate the identified risks, which could imply those associated with illegal content, impact
on human rights such as freedom of expression along with any kind of malicious interference involving for
instance public health issues and elections
142
.
5.3 Civil Society
Civil society is at the heart of identification responses (monitoring, fact-checking and investigative
journalism). This dimension is just one layer of rights-based defences against disinformation, which
dovetails with human rights-oriented approaches to the problem. This approach seeks to instil greater
empowerment within the users or target audiences of disinformation to heighten their resistance to its
pernicious effects. As Chapter 7 will show, good-quality journalism and media pluralism are key in building
societal resilience to disinformation.
6 EU responses to disinformation
'What convinces masses are not facts, and not even invented facts,
but only the consistency of the system of which they are
presumably part.'
Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism
Key takeaways
• In recent years, the European Union – along with many democratic countries and international
organisations – has made progress in building its toolbox to orchestrate a coordinated defence of
democratic values against the threat of disinformation.
• With the European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital Services Act, the EU upgrades its regulation
of internet platforms and its commitment to tackling disinformation.
• The balance between regulation and freedom of expression raises difficult and sensitive questions
that need full and open political debate in the EP plenary. The EP needs not only to be the advocate
for global human rights but also the forum where these complex issues are tackled.
• The Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-24 gives the EP a reference point as well as a
platform from which to exert stronger influence over the EU’s commitments to human rights in the fight
against disinformation.
The European Union has gradually put in place a wide-ranging toolbox for countering disinformation. This
toolbox contains many elements, internal and external, that overlap with one another. In the context of
142
James R. Carroll Brian W. Duwe David C. Eisman Patrick Fitzgerald Todd E. Freed Marc S. Gerber Richard J. Grossman Michael E.
Leiter Stuart D. Levi William Ridgway Jason D. Russell David E. Schwartz Ingrid Vandenborre Helena J. Derbyshire Jessica N. Cohen
Peter Luneau Jamie S. Talbot Eve-Christie Vermynck, Privacy & Cybersecurity Update, Skadden, January 2021.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
30
this study, we are concerned with those elements which not only speak most directly to the human rights
dimensions of EU policies, but also could be relevant for addressing disinformation challenges abroad. The
protection and the promotion of human rights combine to form one of the general principles of European
law
143
.
In its Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: a European Approach
144
, the European
Commission acknowledges that democratic societies, or societies that aspire to live with the same or
similar values as enjoyed in the European Union, ‘depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of
verifiable information so that they can form a view on different political issues. In this way, citizens can
participate in public debates from an informed position and express their will through free and fair political
processes’.
The European Council’s Strategic Agenda 2019-2024
145
includes disinformation under a chapter on
‘Protecting citizens and freedoms’ as it is deemed a menace to citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms,
as well as democratic values and the rule of law. It includes disinformation alongside cybercrime, on the
assumption that these two phenomena come from hostile state and non-state actors. The Council
stipulates that efforts to protect democratic institutions from hybrid threats (like disinformation) must
respect fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression.
The EU has developed a varied toolkit, intensifying its efforts particularly since March 2015 when the
European Council ‘stressed the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns’, following
the annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine
146
. Figure 4 below presents a general
overview of actions and initiatives take at EU level, clearly showing the acceleration and intensification of
EU responses to the threat in recent years.
143
TEU (art 2) states that: 'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and
men prevail.'
144
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling online disinformation: a European Approach, COM/2018/236
final, April 2018.
145
European Council, A new strategic agenda for the EU 2019-2024, June 2020.
146
European Council, European Council Conclusions on external relations (19 March 2015), March 2015.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
31
Figure 4. EU’s Actions and initiatives against disinformation
Source: Chart elaborated by CIDOB in January 2021 based on Factbooks produced by the European Commission.
6.1 The EU’s policy framework and instruments focusing on
disinformation and European democracy
6.1.1 The EEAS Strategic Communication Division
In March 2015, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was tasked with countering disinformation.
The EEAS lies at the heart of the EU’s external strategy related to foreign disinformation campaigns and is
responsible for implementing the Action Plan Against Disinformation and the Rapid Alert System (see
further below). The Task Forces focussing on the eastern and southern neighbourhoods and the Western
Balkans are the main units dealing with proactive communication activities to counter disinformation.
The East StratCom Task Force unit (ESCTF) was initially formed as the core of EU efforts against a
disinformation challenge directly linked with Russia’s efforts to destabilise EU electoral processes and
political debate. Under its activities, monitoring, identifying and debunking have become important
aspects of the EU’s strategy in countering disinformation. However, newer StratCom Units working in the
Western Balkans and Southern neighbourhood have also broadened their scope of work, as they look
beyond merely identifying disinformation to strengthening the overall resilience of societies against this
threats.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
32
At the same time, the EEAS has been dealing with other security aspects linked to these unconventional
challenges to the EU's political and societal resilience. For instance, an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell within the EU
Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) of the EEAS has been focussing on analysing external aspects
of hybrid threats such as massive information campaigns, the recruitment of radicals or the use of proxy
actors to conduct certain acts.
All these tools have placed the EEAS in a central coordinating position within the EU's strategy against
disinformation, combining monitoring, analysis, public diplomacy and strategic communications and
involving 140 EU delegations and offices around the world.
6.1.2 The Rapid Alert System
In preparation for the European elections during May 2019, the EU established a Rapid Alert System (RAS),
implemented in the EEAS to coordinate with Member States and aiming to:
• facilitate information sharing;
• expose disinformation in real time;
• and coordinate with other multilateral efforts by the G-7 Rapid Response Mechanism and NATO.
Despite the deployment of these tools, isolated cyber-attacks, data protection and other elections-related
complaints were still reported
147
.
The acceleration of COVID-19 infodemics has prompted the EU to upgrade its toolkit and, crucially, more
tightly link its strategy against disinformation to new human rights and democracy commitments.
6.1.3 The Action Plan Against Disinformation and the Code of Practice on
Disinformation
In Autumn 2018, the European Commission developed an Action Plan Against Disinformation and
concluded agreements for a Code of Practice on Disinformation with major social media companies. The
Code was ‘an experiment in voluntary self-regulation by the tech industry’
148
. Some civil society
organisations have criticised the Code for theoretically allowing – and even incentivising – restrictions on
the freedom of speech that are claimed to be technically lawful
149
. The European Commission complained
about the initial compliance reports produced by these platforms, with former Commissioner Julian King
describing them as ‘patchy, opaque and self-selecting’
150
.
These initiatives for tackling disinformation did not come with precise impact measurement indicators.
They did not carry quantitative goals to prove how EU actions have helped to combat disinformation.
Hence, the European Court of Auditors’ decision to probe into the impact of the 2018 Action Plan against
Disinformation reflected concerns over its efficacy
151
. The European Democracy Action Plan (presented in
Section 6.1.5) offers the opportunity to strengthen the Code of Practice.
147
European Commission, Commission reports on 2019 European elections: fostering European debates and securing free and fair
elections, June 2020.
148
James Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Crafting A Disinformation Framework, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Future Threats Future Solutions series, n 2, September 2020.
149
Aleksandra Kuczerawy, Fighting Online Disinformation: Did the EU Code of Practice Forget about Freedom of Expression?, in
Georgios Terzis, Dariusz Kloza, Elzbieta Kuzelewska and Daniel Trottier (eds.), ‘Disinformation and Digital Media as a Challenge for
Democracy’, European Integration and Democracy Series, Vol. 6, June 2020.
150
Stolton, Samuel ‘EU Commission hits out at Facebook’s disinformation report’. EurActiv, Published on 20 January 2019. [Accessed
07 January 2021]
151
European Court of Auditors, Auditors look into the EU’s fight against disinformation, ECA Press Release of 17 March 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
33
6.1.4 The European Digital Media Observatory
Strengthening journalism and supporting fact-checking to counter disinformation have been prioritised in
building resilience inside the EU. Following the 2018 Communication on Tackling online disinformation: a
European approach
152
, the Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis (SOMA) was
launched with support from the European Commission. It aimed to connect researchers, fact-checkers and
media organisations. Building on that idea of a multidisciplinary approach and on a governance structure
independent from public authorities, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)
153
opened in June
2020 to facilitate closer coordination amongst fact-checking organisations, the scientific community,
media practitioners and teachers with technological platforms and public authorities. The EDMO will offer
new funding for targeted research on tackling disinformation and, although aimed at strengthening the
EU media ecosystem, it could also set a model for building robust regional journalistic networks
internationally.
6.1.5 The European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital Services Act
At the end of 2020 the Commission presented the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) together with
its proposal for an updated e-commerce directive, the Digital Services Act (DSA). Both initiatives take an
expansive view of digital regulatory policy by proposing to introduce legally binding tools, especially with
regards to the accountability and transparency of digital platforms. These measures seek to enhance the
EU’s democratic resilience and regulatory toolbox. On the one hand, the EDAP pledges to revamp the Code
of Practice on disinformation and reinforce the EU policy framework more broadly. On the other, the DSA’s
promise to develop ‘systemic rules for the online ecosystem’
154
could offer a template for global digital
governance – as sought by the European Parliament
155
. Taken together, these two initiatives offer the
prospect of a more ambitious European Commission effort to protect fundamental rights.
6.2 Key elements of the EU’s external Human Rights and Democracy
Toolbox
6.2.1 EU human rights guidelines
In May 2014 the Foreign Affairs Council adopted the EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of
Expression Online and Offline, one of the earliest and most significant element of its human rights toolbox.
It provided officials and staff with practical guidance on how to contribute in preventing potential
violations affecting freedom of opinion and expression. The document establishes six priority action areas:
• Combating violence, persecution, harassment and intimidation of individuals, including journalists and
other media actors exercising their right to freedom of expression online and offline, as well as
combating impunity for such crimes;
• Promoting laws and practices that protect freedom of opinion and expression;
• Promoting media freedom and pluralism together with fostering an understanding among public
authorities of dangers from unwarranted interference with impartial/critical reporting;
152
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Tackling Online Disinformation: a European Approach, COM(2018)
236 final, April 2018.
153
See EDMO webpage.
154
Access Now, DSA: European Commission delivers on the first step toward systemic rules for online platforms, Published on 15
December 2020 [Accessed 07 January 2021]
155
European Parliament, Digital: The EU must set the standards for regulating online platforms, say MEPs, EP Press release of 20
October 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
34
• Promoting and respecting human rights in cyberspace as well as other information and
communication technologies;
• Promoting best practices by companies;
• Promoting legal amendments and practices aimed at strengthening data protection and privacy
online/offline;
These guidelines were at the core of specific programmes such as Media4Democracy, a project aimed at
enhancing EU Delegations’ capacity for strategic advocacy, media sector engagement as well as promoting
freedom of expression and media pluralism around the world
156
. Media4Democracy was established by the
European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and
was backed by a consortium of civil organisations working on media development and supporting
freedom of expression such as Article19, Deutsche Welle Akademie, European Partnership for Democracy,
Free Press Unlimited and the Thomson Foundation. This constitutes one clear example of EU mechanisms
and instruments being used to address the phenomenon of information disorder.
6.2.2 EU engagement with civil society and human rights dialogues
During 2014, the EU also started elaborating Roadmaps for engagement with civil society in external
relations so as to promote a meaningful participation of CSOs in the domestic policies of partner
countries
157
. The EU Roadmaps for engagement with CSOs, introduced in 2012 by the Commission
Communication on the roots of democracy and sustainable development, were meant to ensure
structured dialogue and strategic cooperation with civil society and international actors, thereby
increasing the consistency and impact of EU actions. These roadmaps could also play an important role in
supporting civil society responses to disinformation.
Shrinking democratic space for civil society has led the European Union to strengthen policies and
instruments against new challenges to democratic processes inside and outside the EU. Another important
initiative in this context has been the Human Rights Defenders Protection Mechanism – known as
ProtectDefenders.eu – , which was established in 2010 to support human rights defenders facing imminent
threats.
158
Civil society organisations are also demanding a more meaningful role in the Human Rights Dialogues that,
since December 2001, form one of the EU's non-coercive foreign policy tools to promote human rights
policies in third countries or with other regional organisations
159
. The EU Action Plan for Human Rights and
Democracy (see section 6.2.4 below) incorporates the priority of reinforcing the political, human rights and
sectoral policy dialogues as one of the effective tools for this plan’s implementation.
6.2.3 Election observation and democracy support
In October 2019, the European Council adopted the ‘Council Conclusions on Democracy’ with its
commitment to increase EU efforts in democracy-building capacities within third countries. This includes
the promotion of inclusive and credible electoral processes through EU election observation and support
156
See Media4Democracy webpage.
157
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's
engagement with Civil Society in external relations, COM(2012) 492 final, September 2012.
158
See ProtectDefenders.eu
159
The Human Rights and Democracy Network recommendations for the revision of the EU guidelines on human rights dialogues
with third countries, announced in December 2020, regret that CSOs are very rarely allowed to participate directly in the dialogues
and demand more ambition and a stronger communication.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
35
to domestic electoral observers
160
. In this context, the EU's elections observation missions have developed
a methodology to monitor online political campaigns with the aim of identifying and tackling the
challenging effects of disinformation, manipulation and hate speech in their undermining of democratic
processes. This methodology has already been tested by electoral missions in Peru, Sri Lanka and Tunisia.
The Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy also supports ‘the development of policy frameworks
that apply offline rules on elections and democratic processes to the online context, and assist to build
capacities to implement them’
161
. Election observation is the starting point for further cooperation with
third countries, also at parliamentary level.
6.2.4 The Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy for 2020-2024 and funding
tools
Adopted by the Council at the end of November 2020, the Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy
lists among its priorities: ‘Promoting efforts to counter disinformation, hate speech, extremist and terrorist
content, including online media literacy and digital skills; Supporting independent fact-checking and
research, investigative reporting and quality journalism, including at local level’. This 2020-2024 iteration
of the Action Plan stresses these digital issues to a much greater extent than was evident in previous
versions covering the 2010s. The Action Plan has a very political ambition to enhance EU leadership in
promoting and protecting human rights as well as democracy worldwide and to improve coherence, unity
and efficiency not only between member states but also in all areas of EU external action. The plan is also
important as an umbrella strategy that nominally guides EU funding and other decisions on the ground in
countries around the world. The priority now attached to disinformation opens up the prospect of higher
levels of funding for this issue in the EU’s external action over the years ahead.
In line with this Action Plan’s remit, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is
the EU’s flagship funding instrument dedicated to democracy and human right issues. Under the 2014-
2020 multiannual financial framework, the EIDHR enjoyed an annual budget of around EUR 160 million,
higher than the previous budget period. Unlike parts of the toolbox outlined above, the EIDHR is not
concerned specifically with disinformation. Yet, it has increasingly funded initiatives in third countries
related to digital concerns, including disinformation. The EIDHR’s approach is somewhat indirect in this
sense: it funds civil society organisations seeking to tackle local disinformation problems. In recent years
this has comprised a range of media literacy initiatives, alongside training and capacity-buildings for CSOs
on digital protection and rights.
Geographically defined aid instruments have offered some supplementary funding for similar
programmes. One example of this comes from the European Neighbourhood Instrument’s funds for
counter-disinformation in Eastern Partnership countries. This work is focused on the analysis and exposure
of state-driven pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives. Funded initiatives focus on strengthening resilience
and increasing awareness within society. The EU supports media outlets and projects aimed at increasing
media literacy as well as enhancing citizen-led journalism. It also funds civil society actors and fact-
checking initiatives to expose online disinformation stories. Local fact-checking organisations in states like
Georgia and Ukraine contribute to the EUvsDisinfo platform and public database, which produces and
stores a weekly disinformation newsletter (Disinforeview) summarising major Pro-Kremlin trends. This
platform allows policymakers working on disinformation to improve the tailoring of their strategies and
action plans to counter disinformation both EU wide and in neighbouring countries. The EU also works
160
Council of the European Union, Democracy: EU adopts conclusions, Published on 14 October 14 2019. [Accessed on 07 January
2021]
161
European Commission, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Action Plan on Human Rights and
Democracy 2020-2024', March 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
36
with state officials to improve their strategic communication skills in counteracting the push-back against
disinformation.
These trends are highly relevant within a human rights-centred approach. While Stratcom entails the EU
itself rebutting disinformation, the EIDHR and other instruments fund local rights-oriented groups to build
their own capacities to push back against digital control and manipulation as part of their human rights
work. At the time of writing, the precise structure and details of democracy and human rights funding for
the 2020-2027 period are still being finalised. However, it seems that the level of funding allotted to
countering disinformation will increase modestly. A new catch-all Neighbourhood, Development and
International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) will act as an umbrella for thematic programmes, including
one for democracy and human rights.
6.2.5 Restrictive measures
The EU can to use sanctions and conditionality in relation to human rights and democracy. These are not
specific to disinformation, but are a crucial part of the Union’s external toolbox for human rights concerns.
All EU agreements with third countries have since long included essential element clauses for human rights
and democracy. The EU has in recent years taken steps to impose restrictive measures against individuals
from countries such as Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, Venezuela and Zimbabwe involved in human rights abuses.
It has also withheld some aid and trade preferences to countries suffering democratic backsliding and
human rights problems. These are generally not measures imposed against regime disinformation as such,
but they have targeted human-rights abuses carried out by some of the regimes most heavily implicated
in the use of disinformation.
In December 2020 the EU adopted its long-awaited Global Human Rights sanctions regime and applied
measures under this framework in several instances in early 2021. This will make it easier for the EU to
impose sanctions on individuals deemed to be guilty of serious human rights abuses, separately from the
Union’s country strategies. While disinformation may not be a direct, explicit focus of this regime, the EU
may be able to more readily target government officials where they abuse the risk of disinformation to
suppress media freedom. The sanctions regime includes freedom of expression as one of the rights whose
breach will justify restrictive measures. This is one of the rights most threatened by disinformation (see
Chapter 3). Accordingly, the EDAP already mentions the EU's need for further development of tools which
will impose 'costs on the perpetrators' of foreign interference and influence operations
162
.
The Commission has floated the possibility of developing a sanctions regime specifically for disinformation
as part of steps to take forward the European Democracy Action Plan, although it is not yet clear whether
this would still apply only to disinformation’s impact on EU citizens or also cover human rights
infringements within third countries
163
.
162
Council of the European Union, Cyber attacks: EU ready to respond with a range of measures, including sanctions, Press release
of 19 June 2017.
163
Alexandra Brzozowski, Commission floats sanctions regime for disinformation offenders, EurActiv, Published on 3 December
2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
37
Figure 5. Key actors and strategies against disinformation
6.3 The European Parliament’s role
The balance between regulation and freedom of expression raises difficult and sensitive questions that call
for full and open political debate in the EP plenary. Accordingly, the European Parliament must not only
continue to advocate global human rights when it comes to tackling disinformation, but also provide the
assembly within which these complex issues can be tackled. Indeed, the EU Action Plan on Human Rights
and Democracy 2020-24 highlights the European Parliament’s key role in supporting human rights, which
includes fighting disinformation. During interviews conducted specifically for this study, MEPs indicated
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
38
their full awareness of the EP’s role as a speaker for human rights defenders. Additionally, these interviews
revealed common political ground between different ideological perspectives in tackling disinformation
through a human rights lens. MEPs need to continue collaborating in monitoring the precise follow-
through and results from activities involving various parts of the EU toolbox, as described in Section 6.2.
The EP also has a role in working with other parliaments around the world to strengthen global standards.
It could take the lead together with parliaments from like-minded countries such as Australia, Japan and
Canada to push for a UN Convention on Universal Digital (Human) Rights
164,165
. To move matters forward,
the European Parliament will have a role in cooperating with the Council of Europe, the body which houses
much of the requisite expertise, along with civil society organisations that have already attempted to work
up drafts of such a new document. Hence, parliamentary delegations to third countries and the EU
delegation to the UN should form the platforms from which actions to counter disinformation can be
initiated.
The European Parliament has put in place a special committee on ‘Foreign Interference in all Democratic
Processes in the European Union including Disinformation’ (INGE). Through its regular contact with other
Parliaments around the world, the EP is able to exchange ideas on best practices with third countries
regarding parliamentary processes in this field. For example, the Inter-Parliamentary Union has held initial
discussions on the issue of disinformation and is forming its own conclusions
166
. Others have formally
debated the increasing threat posed by disinformation and the British parliament
167
, for instance, has
created the International Grand Committee. This is the first of its kind to promote further cross-border co-
operation in tackling the spread of disinformation. The EP is a natural partner for these other chambers
which seek to approach disinformation from the perspectives of democracy and human rights.
In our interviews, MEPs stressed how important it is for the EP to develop a more proactive role in the
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024. They also highlighted the value of inter-
parliamentary delegations in facilitating exchanges of information between MEPs and their peers. The
input from inter-parliamentary delegations allows MEPs to play a critical role in giving voice to global
citizens’ rights. Indeed, the Action Plan emphasises the importance of support to parliamentary
institutions. This gives the EP a reference point and platform from which to exert stronger influence over
the EU’s external toolbox and ensure that this gives adequate protection inter alia to human rights in the
fight against disinformation.
The EP can also advocate funding increases for projects aimed at counteracting disinformation. Interviews
with MEPs have revealed that they are already aware of civil society organisations’ need for more resources
if they are to prevail in the fight against this problematic and worrying issue.
164
The IO Foundation defines Digital Rights as an extension of Human Rights in the digital space; both the public spaces on the
Internet and private networks.
165
See the result of the workshop Future-proofing our digital rights; and Article 19’s ‘Universal Declaration of Digital Rights’,
Internet Rights & Principle’s Coalition’s ‘Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet’; or ZEIT-Stiftung’s ‘Charter of
Fundamental Digital Rights of the European Union’ which was presented to the European Parliament in 2016
166
Inter-Parliamentary Union,’Key conclusions from the April 2019 expert hearing on disinformation and ‘fake news’, Innovation
tracker, Issue 2, June 2019.
167
UK Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee , Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report, House of Commons,
Eighth Report of Session 2017–19, 2019.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
39
7 Rights-based initiatives against disinformation: identifying
best practices
'Whenever there is repression, there is resistance'
Hong Kong activist Nathan Law
168
Key takeaways
• EU external policies can helpfully learn from practices emerging around the world that tackle
disinformation through a human rights lens.
• Such ‘best practices’ offer useful policy ideas and pointers, but far greater support is needed if they are
to be extended and strengthened.
• The EU needs to offer such support for the different levels that this report has identified as crucial to
holistic policy approaches, both within governments and civil society.
• While policies aimed at governmental and regulatory measures are important, it is vital that more
bottom-up approaches are not overlooked, as the development of civil capacity to deal with
disinformation is particularly crucial for the EU to support human rights.
As the scale of disinformation has increased in recent years, so have efforts to tackle it. There are many
different practices across the world that the EU can draw from in facing the challenge to counter
disinformation in ways that are consistent with and indeed further human rights. Whilst many emerging
approaches to disinformation do not sit easily with human rights commitments, others have already begun
to map strategies that fuse together disinformation and human rights concerns.
This is now a vast field as policy responses and new initiatives have increased exponentially over recent
years. We do not aim here to offer any kind of exhaustive account of best practices, but rather concentrate
on a select number of lessons that might be of specific relevance to EU external support for human rights
and democracy in line with its counter disinformation aims. There are several practices emerging around
the world that can and should be included within the range of EU policy instruments outlined in previous
sections of this report. In line with the distinction drawn between different actors referred to in Chapter 5,
these practices are evident among both governments and civil society bodies.
7.1 Government and parliamentary responses
At the level of governments and public authorities, a number of dimensions from emerging practices are
relevant for human rights considerations
169
. In some countries, governments and state authorities have
begun to monitor the human rights impacts of their new legal restrictions against disinformation. An
increasing number of states have also introduced measures specifically around the time of elections, when
countering disinformation is integrally linked to the protection of core democratic rights. There are best
practice examples of electoral commissions working to increase transparency of information in election
campaigns. Furthermore, broader government responses have targeted the mechanisms of disinformation
with the aim of giving citizens more effective rights to free choice and information. Authorities in many
168
Marc Perelman, Hong Kong activist Nathan Law: 'Whenever there is repression, there is resistance', France24, Published on 28
July 2021.
169
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
40
countries have worked hard on: pressing platforms to introduce more effective and transparent
algorithms; curating practices that improve editorial processes and online community standards; and
demonetisation rules that stop disinformation being profitable.
A number of countries have already introduced policies that appear to acknowledge human rights
considerations within their strategies to counter disinformation. A selection of these can be mentioned,
chosen on the basis that they have nested counter-disinformation efforts within a focus on core democratic
processes, rights protection and citizens’ engagement.
Taiwan is often cited as offering best practice to the extent that its public authorities have developed a
digital strategy which reflects the concerns and criticisms of rights-oriented bodies. The country is
considered to be a leader in developing digital policies predicated on societal participation and democratic
legitimacy; its best practice resides in the way that formal government commitments are joined together
with civil society input
170
. This core approach has been successful during the coronavirus pandemic, when
the health emergency has further deepened the government’s commitment to rights-led and participative
approaches to disinformation
171
. The underlying rationale is that of a collective societal involvement in
pushing back against disinformation
172
.
The Canadian government has developed a range of good practices, including its Digital Citizen Initiative.
Canada offers a best practice example of a government obliging tech companies to increase transparency
in political content, particularly around the time of elections. Its Critical Election Incident Public Protocol
173
,
established for the 2019 general election, is a strong example of effective action. Australia has developed
a similar Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce
174
.
Other examples where governments and parliaments have been highly attentive to freedom of speech
concerns include Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. In the latter country, legal rights protection has
had an impact, as courts have overturned many cyber libel cases on freedom of speech grounds. Counter-
disinformation has been approached increasingly through a narrative of defending democratic rights in
the wake of President Park Gun-Hye’s impeachment and the election of her replacement. Supported by a
range of public authorities and multiple coordination efforts, fact-checking around South Korea’s elections
provides an example of good practice in tightly linking counter-disinformation to the defence of core
democratic rights and process
175
.
In Eastern Europe, Ukraine presents an example of significant policy shift. The Ukrainian government was
widely criticised for an overly draconian approach to Russian disinformation when it set up a Ministry for
Information Policy in 2014. More recently it has focused more on empowering citizens to recognise
disinformation and be more discerning generally in their consumption of apparently genuine
information
176
.
Many examples from Latin America offer potential good practice lessons. For instance, the Argentinian
government has developed strong provisions against misleading political advertising
177
. The incumbent
170
Rorry Daniels, Taiwan’s unlikely path to public trust provides lessons for the US, Brookings, 2020.
171
Kelsie Nabben, Hacking the pandemic: how Taiwan’s digital democracy holds COVID-19 at bay, The Conversation, Published on
11 September 2020.
172
Elizabeth Lange, How One Social Media App Is Beating Disinformation, Foreign Policy, published on 23 November 2020.
173
Government of Canada, Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, 2019.
174
See AEC Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce webpage.
175
Lim Boyoung, What’s behind South Korea’s fact-checking boom? Tense politics, and the decline of investigative journalism,
Poynter, published on 16 June 2017.
176
Olga Robinson, Alistair Coleman and Shayan Sardarizadeh, A report of Anti-Disinformation Initiatives, Oxford Internet Institute,
2019.
177
Ruth Levush, Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms: Comparative Summary, Law Library of
Congress, September 2019.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
41
president there and other presidential candidates also cooperated on a campaign against disinformation
in the 2019 elections and support a wider, multi-stakeholder coalition, Reverso, in developing a wider set
of measures
178
. In Uruguay, political parties went a step further by signing a formal ‘ethical pact’,
committing not to engage in disinformation during election campaigning
179
.
Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court ran a counter disinformation campaign to defend the integrity of elections
in 2018, linking the issue specifically to democratic rights. Mexico’s National Electoral Institute (INE) worked
with tech companies on a similar initiative to shore-up democratic elections
180
. This was the first election
management body in the world to have Memoranda of Understanding with Facebook, Twitter and Google,
as well as engaging with organisations such as the Venice Commission. The Mexican case has been
considered a good practice model, covering both disinformation and campaign finance regulation, by
other countries such as Tunisia
181
.
This short selection of cases is not meant to imply any overarching general conclusions about the direction
of travel in government policies around the world. Nevertheless, the aforementioned examples could
provide helpful inspiration and lessons for the EU’s external disinformation and human rights policies.
Advanced democracies such as Canada, South Korea or Taiwan may not need direct EU support, but could
certainly offer useful templates for the EU to build on and fund in other third countries. For countries where
governments are broadly democratic and proactively committed to human rights, the best practice
examples could usefully be built into EU-supported partnerships and programmes run with governments
and state authorities.
In other countries where public authorities have tended to undercut more than protect human rights and
democratic processes, the EU will instead need to exert critical diplomatic pressure to push governments
to accept best practices. This applies probably to most countries where the EU has high-priority and
challenging foreign-policy agendas. This focus will often entail the EU using its diplomatic leverage to
persuade other states into meeting the standards of human rights best practice by building freedom of
expression guarantees relevant to disinformation into their legislation. Of course, the EU does at the same
time need to exercise caution as authoritarian regimes such as those in Cambodia, China, Russia and
Thailand have already launched counter disinformation initiatives that clearly serve political interests.
The EU has made important steps forward in building counter-disinformation measures into its Election
Observation Missions, closely resonating with the kind of best practice examples which combine
democracy-protection and counter-disinformation. Developing this emerging area of work further would
be extremely valuable in broadening the EU’s disinformation policies into a more political direction. Where
public authorities are themselves implicated in election-related disinformation – as is the case in a sizeable
and growing number of countries around the world – this will require more robust EU responses to
governments’ manipulation of democratic processes. In deepening an already promising focus on
election-related disinformation, the EU could gainfully draw upon the kinds of positive examples being
demonstrated in Canada and some Latin American countries.
Building on many of these emergent best practices, governments are now involving parliaments in
working against disinformation, thereby offering important templates and reference points for the future
178
For more information about Reverso see here.
179
UNDP, Partidos políticos uruguayos firmaron pacto ético contra la desinformación, Press release of 26 April 2019.
180
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
181
Beata Martin-Rozumiłowicz and Rasto Kužel, ‘Social Media, Disinformation and Electoral Integrity’, International Foundation
for Electoral Systems, Working Paper, August 2019.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
42
in the fight against disinformation. The parliamentary dimension will be very much central to a rights-
based approach.
7.2 Civil society pathways
Notwithstanding the opportunities for formal government and parliamentary engagement, the EU needs
to pay equal attention to supporting non-governmental actors in its external policies. Best practice from a
human rights angle often benefits from a more bottom-up approach that focuses on strengthening civic
capacity against disinformation.
However, such civil society dimensions cannot easily be employed as some kind of panacea. In highly
repressive regimes it may be impossible to pursue effective civic initiatives. Furthermore, not all civil society
is liberal, pro-democratic and supportive of human rights; indeed, research has shown that in recent years
certain sections of civil society around the world have become part of the disinformation problem rather
than its antidote
182
. Yet, this kind of support has been effective in many contexts as an element of EU
democracy and human rights support; the EU itself has acknowledged the core role of civil society in all its
key documents on democracy and human rights over many years. It is one important strand that should
not be overlooked, especially as this kind of right-based empowerment is appropriate in a practical sense
to the funding instruments and toolbox that the EU has at its disposal in many third countries.
This civic-centred approach certainly fits with UNESCO’s call for responses that strengthen societal
cohesion around a new social contract, within which citizens are able to exercise their rights in pushing
back against disinformation
183
. It is an approach that is aligned with external EU human rights and support
for democracy, so much so that it works on the assumption that a more effective exercise of democratic
rights is one vital part of counter-disinformation strategies.
This civil society dimension is of particular importance in responding to this study’s human rights remit,
particularly in cases where governments themselves generate and deploy disinformation, typically as part
of policies which are deliberately designed to limit democratic checks and balances. The UNESCO report
suggests that this means many best practice regulations or voluntary codes cannot be used elsewhere in
the world where fewer checks and balances exist
184
.
As shown in Table 3 earlier (see Chapter 5), some civil society best practice responses are about revealing
and monitoring disinformation, such as fact-checking. Others are about generating alternative, reliable
sources of information. The logic here is that free and active journalism increases the exertion of a core
democratic right in efforts against disinformation, while government bans on certain sites and publications
undercut it. Finally, some practices are about education and media literacy, encouraging a more critical use
of platforms from citizens.
It is important to stress that such local rights-building strategies go well beyond the strong tendency to
focus on fact-checking within standard news outlets. There are now hundreds of initiatives run by large
media organisations, international NGOs, international institutions and tech companies aimed at tracking
and exposing disinformation, finding ways to flag this online, developing standards about sources and the
like. These approaches will naturally continue to be at the forefront of efforts against disinformation.
However, our concern here is also broader, in that we need to examine how strategies against
disinformation adopted by third countries can link more closely with local agendas on protecting human
rights and strengthening democratic control. While locally-rooted fact-checking operations have an
important role to play in this sense, a rights-led approach also requires a more pre-emptive ethos. The
182
Richard Youngs, Civic Activism Unleashed: New Hope or False Dawn for Democracy?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
183
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
184
K. Bontcheva and J. Posetti, 2020.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
43
underlying rationale must be about how communities generate, consume and engage with information
and not simply about correcting misleading information after-the-fact.
Over recent years, many examples of best practice initiatives have emerged and developed, seeking to
adopt a rights-strengthening approach in tackling disinformation. While diverse, they entail a shared
concern about building civic capacity, which in turn helps local communities gain stronger control and
become more critically engaged with information flows. They can be defined as best practice in the fact
that they seek to empower local communities in deliberating on the issue of disinformation and deciding
on own priorities, while enhancing civic capacity to monitor and redress rights abuses in government
digital strategies.
We offer here just a few illustrative civil society initiatives, selected on the basis of these criteria related to
local civic engagement and monitoring capacities.
7.2.1 Middle East and North Africa
In Lebanon, Megaphone is a volunteer collective of local journalists that generates news narratives
designed to reach young audiences affected by disinformation. It does not aim to teach what is good or
bad information, but rather produces short-form news stories in ways that younger people can relate to,
as an indirect way of providing them with stronger resilience against disinformation. Its basic approach is
expressly to ensure an ‘equality of rights’ as a route into tackling information distortions
185
.
Syrian Archive is a Syrian project that preserves and memorialises documentation of human rights
violations and crimes for advocacy as well as accountability reasons. By doing so, the organisation fights
disinformation around these conflict related issues that have profoundly damaged Syrian society. It is a
project run by Mnemonic, a non-profit organisation dedicated to archiving disappearing digital material.
They accept non-governmental funding and are fully independent. They have already reinstated 350 357
videos onto social media platforms
186
. Verify Syria is another ambitious and vital initiative that has been
seeking to counter disinformation in the Syrian conflict through local engagement
187
.
7.2.2 Asia
The Digital Empowerment Foundation (DEF) works across 500 villages of India, empowering communities
with access to digital tools which can be used against disinformation that has become so widespread there
in recent years. The organisation focuses on ensuring that community members have some understanding
of accessing and evaluating information before it is consumed. DEF has a number of signature
programmes, including on the digital empowerment of community organisations; the digital protection
of CSOs; digital rural entrepreneurship; and a COVID-19 Digital Emergency Relief Programme
188
.
7.2.3 Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, Russian and other external influence operations have prompted a wave of counter-
disinformation civic initiatives. FactCheck Georgia founded in 2013 by Georgia’s Reforms Associates
(GRASS) runs capacity-building initiatives related to disinformation
189
. In Ukraine, VoxCheck was founded
in 2015 by VoxUkraine with a similar approach
190
. StopFake was founded in 2014 by students and faculty
members at the Kyiv Mohyla School of Journalism
191
. A notable feature in this region is how closely such
initiatives are nested within broader CSO work to defend democracy and further human rights.
185
France24, Megaphone, the independent news platform giving voice to Lebanon’s uprising, Published on 16 November 2019.
186
See Syrian Archive webpage.
187
See Verify webpage.
188
See Digital Empowerment Foundation webpage.
189
See FactCheck Georgia webpage.
190
See VoxCheck webpage.
191
See StopFake webpage.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
44
7.2.4 Latin America
Chicas Poderosas is a company started in 2013 and now operating in 13 Latin American countries. It aims
at providing digital and media skills as well as leadership to women at community level. This company has
created investigative journalism workshops and ‘hackathons’ to provide women with skills to facilitate
their reporting on issues accurately, so they can hold to account people in positions of power. It oversees
a New Ventures Lab that provides women with guidance and funding for entrepreneurial news or media
ventures that seeks truth and information
192
.
A Mexico-based company called Animal Politico runs an independent digital media site that is focused on
grassroots investigative journalism with citizen-driven questions on political issues. It provides
verifications, news and visualisations of issues, as a way of pushing back against disinformation from a
rights perspective
193
.
Comprova in Brazil and Re-verso in Argentina have been collaborative efforts between media companies
and CSOs to fact-check around elections in these two countries
194
.
7.2.5 Africa
The Centre for Innovation and Technology (CITE), is a project located in Zimbabwe that combines digital
technology, fact-checking journalism and an emphasis on the promotion of social accountability at local
government level. CITE produces reports, videos and podcasts testing claims made by public figures and
institutions against hard evidence
195
. The logic is to generate pressure from local level against the effects
of disinformation, something which has become increasingly pervasive in Zimbabwe, hindering
democratic transition.
Pesa Check is a fact-checking indigenous project in East Africa that holds public figures accountable. It
verifies financial and statistical numbers quoted by government leaders in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It
publishes clear articles on what information is true and what is false so that citizens are more informed on
public information
196
.
AfricaCheck is the main umbrella for fact-checking across Africa and has been functioning since 2012. It
tests politicians’ statements as requested by readers. The initiative has dozens of international funders
197
.
7.2.6 Multi-regional projects
People in Need has a programme called One World in Schools (OWIS) that uses documentary films and
associated activities to develop critical thinking skills as a foundation for developing citizenship skills. One
important sphere of this OWIS programme is media literacy work. This is very much a grassroots, youth-
oriented programme to counter disinformation, whilst at the same time providing the youth with critical
media literacy skills
198
.
Launched by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Tracker-19 is a tool whose name refers to both COVID-19
and Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which protects freedom of expression and
opinion. This project aims to evaluate the COVID-19 pandemic’s impacts on journalism and especially the
192
See Chicas Poderosas webpage.
193
See Animal Politico webpage.
194
Kalina Bontcheva and Julie Posetti (eds.), Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of
Expression, UNESCO Broadband Commission Report, September 2020.
195
See CITE webpage.
196
See Pesa Check webpage.
197
See AfricaCheck webpage.
198
See One World in School.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
45
way it has unleashed a wave of disinformation. The project documents state censorship and disinformation
together with their impact on the right to reliable news and information. It makes recommendations on
how to defend journalism. Tracker-19 offers an interactive world map on the status of press freedom,
constant coverage of developments and analyses of key issues. The tool explicitly combats disinformation
through a focus on freedom of speech
199
.
Meedan has created Check, a product that helps with the newsroom process of identifying misinformation
and automates responses. It is a human and machine system that helps journalists focus on more high-
level work instead of fact-checking. Since October 2019, Meedan has used Check for a global fact-checking
project via WhatsApp in 5 countries: India, Brazil, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. The project has been
supported by both WhatsApp and Facebook. Check can be used for elections, open-source investigations,
translations and research/analysis on misinformation. The focus is on community-building and political
engagement for journalists, students, CSOs, human rights defenders and others
200
.
There are hundreds of similar initiatives currently in place across the world and it is beyond the scope of
this report to offer a comprehensive survey of all such innovative approaches. However, it is important to
stress that we are not concerned here with an assessment of every element of disinformation responses,
but that the focus is on one very specific part of this field. Namely, the types of rights-oriented responses
to disinformation that might be relevant to and built into the EU’s external support programmes.
Several of the EU’s policy documents and funding instruments outlined in Chapter 5 already refer to the
key importance of active citizenship in the sphere of digital information. This is because all these efforts to
approach disinformation through the promotion of more active citizenship give centre-stage to core
citizen rights. They are about putting rights over information more clearly into citizens’ hands – almost the
opposite of legal or regulatory approaches that set limits to what is deemed acceptable information. The
best practice examples mentioned here show the kinds of opportunities that exist for the EU actively to
support such approaches. This is a current area of growth in global civil society, but it need higher levels of
support to keep growing and maintain its incipient momentum.
On fact-checking, an important point to consider is that there has been a dramatic proliferation of large
fact-checking initiatives in the US and European countries. The EU should be careful when it funds them to
undertake fact-checking in other countries, as they can sometimes do so in a way that actually undercuts
local actors’ democratic empowerment.
General human rights work has evolved towards a focus on building local capacities and the EU has played
a valuable role in advancing this trend. If this is true in the generic sphere of human rights, then it is also a
lesson that needs to be applied more specifically in relation to the fight against disinformation’s pernicious
impacts. Better internet standards or regulatory controls over platforms are unlikely to provide far-reaching
solutions in contexts where a wider respect for human rights and democratic norms remains weak and is
declining, as is the case with many – if not most – of the EU’s third-country partners.
In this sense, there are key lessons to be borne in mind and already-existing templates that can feed into a
new EU effort to approach disinformation through a human rights lens. The EU can use these best practices
to inform its human rights external aid programming. Moreover, beyond such funded projects, the EU will
also need to use its full diplomatic weight and leverage to protect these third-country civil initiatives that
routinely find themselves on the receiving end of government restrictions and harassment.
199
See Tracker19 webpage
200
See Meedan webpage.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
46
8 Conclusions and recommendations
The EU must approach the concept of disinformation in a fully comprehensive manner in order to counter
it effectively. This means accepting and adopting the ways in which this challenge has become more
complex and multi-faceted over recent years. It also means tackling not only disinformation itself, but the
many tactics of manipulation that accompany and amplify its pernicious effects. It entails targeting the
multiple instigators and agents that drive disinformation strategies and unpacking the different
motivations behind this phenomenon, whether they be political, financial or reputational. In its external
relations, the EU needs to push back more systematically against both disinformation and a broader range
of deceptive influence strategies.
The relationship between disinformation and human rights is double-edged. Disinformation infringes a
range of core rights. These include: the freedom of thought; the right to privacy; the right to participation;
as well as economic, social and cultural rights. It also diminishes broader indicators of democratic quality
by: weakening trust in democracy; interfering with elections; as well as feeding digital violence and
repression. However, counter-disinformation initiatives also carry risks for human rights and democracy. In
many countries around the world, measures against disinformation have constricted human rights. The EU
needs to support counter-disinformation efforts in its external relations, but at the same time be attentive
to the ways in which these may cut across its human rights objectives.
The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified these trends and problems. It has triggered disinformation
campaigns driven by political and profit-driven motivations. In the last year, a huge amount of
disinformation has spread through social media and the internet, thereby sharpening debate on the
governance of social media. Meanwhile, non-democratic regimes have made use of the pandemic to crack
down on political opposition by restricting freedom of expression and freedom of the media.
Different responses have been initiated to tackle disinformation. Legislative and executive bodies have
tried to regulate the spread of disinformation. Responses have gone from elaborating codes of practice
and best practice guides to enabling verification networks that debunk disinformation. Corporations have
also launched some initiatives to contain disinformation in their cyber-spaces, although it has proved very
difficult to pursue all disinformation on the internet. Civil society has also been mobilised in the fight
against disinformation and the protection of human rights online.
European institutions have begun to develop a series of instruments to fight disinformation, both internally
and externally. The EU’s rights-based culture has helped embed a human rights approach in its internal
actions. In parallel, the EU has begun to build stronger human rights and democracy considerations into
its external actions against disinformation and deceptive influence strategies. The EU’s policy instruments
have improved in this regard over recent years.
Despite this progress, EU efforts to tackle disinformation outside Europe still need to be infused with a
stronger human-rights focus and ethos. The basic challenge remains to find a way of building strategies
against disinformation more fully into the EU’s overarching approach towards human rights
internationally. While the EU’s activity in the field of disinformation has expanded, it has done so as a stand-
alone area of policy rather than as one element integral to polices aimed at rights infringements across the
world. In its external relations, the EU has tended to approach disinformation mainly as a geopolitical
problem – other powers using it to weaken the EU – instead of measuring the human-rights impacts within
third countries. Furthermore, while rhetorically the EU insists that it is committed to ensuring that
disinformation does not weaken global human rights, in practice it has deepened commercial and security
partnerships with many regimes guilty of using disinformation to abuse human rights and undermine
democratic checks and balances.
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
47
The European Parliament has an important role to play in ensuring that the human rights dimension to
counter-disinformation is more prominent in EU external actions. It holds influence over EU laws, external
funds and third-country agreements. It is the appropriate place to have more political discussions around
disinformation. Invitations to intervene in the DROI subcommittees and the INGE Special Committee could
be extended to more national MPs (also from outside the EU), human rights defenders and activists as well
as CSO representatives to learn from other contexts and experiences. Engagement among these actors
could eventually lead to the drafting of a UN Convention on Universal Digital (Human) Rights. The EP also
needs to use its public diplomacy function, giving voice to those who do not have it in their own countries,
improving capacity building and exchanging best practices with other parliaments on how to fight
disinformation.
The EU’s guiding principle must be to combat disinformation without infringing freedom of expression.
This means being attentive to counter-disinformation tactics that undermine human rights and rather
finding other ways to build up the incentives and capacities to lessen disinformation’s reach around the
world. Content regulation can lead to censorship, internet shutdowns and the prosecution of dissenting
voices all ostensibly in the name of fighting disinformation. A human rights perspective needs to be built
into debates on regulations, not only within the EU but also with regard to EU actions in third countries.
The EU should work to prevent the spread of disinformation through holding digital platforms more
accountable for their impacts on democratic rights. The EU should use its diplomatic weight and leverage
to push tech platforms and other governments to coordinate in applying accountability and transparency
standards in third countries – including the US which is the largest companies’ home base. The European
Parliament can also play a role in persuading platforms to implement better standards worldwide, not just
in Western states. More proactive parliamentary diplomacy – through EP relations with parliaments all over
the world but also with private stakeholders – would boost the EU’s capacity to lead on improving global
governance, both in terms of regulations on illegal content that more firmly protect human rights and a
more positive commitment from large tech companies.
The EU could also explore the use of restrictive measures as part of a rights-based approach. Experts have
started debating how penalties could be imposed on those who intentionally seek to manipulate
information against the EU and its Member States
201
. This could in the future lead to some sort of sanctions
regime specifically for disinformation. As outlined above, the focus here has been not on human rights
abuses within third countries, but the use of disinformation against the Union. The EU has generally been
cautious in its use of sanctions and punitive approaches are unlikely to be at the forefront of EU external
actions. Yet, the EU should be open to exploring subtle and careful ways of beginning to tighten the
pressure on regimes guilty of systematic disinformation as part of their authoritarian playbooks.
8.1 Empowering Societies against Disinformation
Chapter 5 of the study suggests that responses to disinformation are needed at different levels: laws and
regulations; corporate actions; and civil society. As well as concentrating on online techniques regarding
various regulations and platforms, the EU should also strengthen its work at civil society level. It should
offer formal and more generous support to third country local communities in their efforts to combat
disinformation. This approach is clearly most consistent with a human rights approach and also resonates
with the kind of policy instruments that the EU has at its disposal in third countries. We put forward five
recommendations that could be useful at grassroots level:
201
Michael Peel and Max Seddon, EU imposes sanctions on 6 Russian officials over Navalny poisoning, Financial Times, Published
on 15 October 2020; RFE/RL, U.S. Imposes New Sanctions Targeting Russian 'Troll Farm,' Owner Prigozhin, Radio Free Europe Radio
Liberty, Published on 30 September 2019.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
48
8.1.1 Supporting local initiatives addressing disinformation
The EU should increase support for local initiatives that seek to give actors within third countries their own
tools and capacities to push back against disinformation. The EU has supported such initiatives and officials
running its aid policies have come to adopt a narrative of ‘human-centric digitalisation’. However, there
remains much scope for such initiatives to become a more central element of the EU’s approach to
disinformation. The EU could stipulate that more of its funding will in the future go to these rights-oriented
initiatives. This would help contextualise disinformation as part of local communities’ broader struggles for
political influence and control. The EP should push to influence EU programming in this direction.
8.1.2 Enhancing support to media pluralism within disinformation strategies
EU policies have, of course, stressed the importance of media pluralism for many years, yet this is arguably
still not a prominent priority within the Union’s overarching external action. The EU could do more to
support a wider range of media sources within third countries, recognising that this is likely to be more
valuable in the longer term than, for instance, funding fact-checking projects with the largest organisation
in a particular third-country partner. Media pluralism might also be made more of a critical prerequisite for
the EU when certain kinds of trade, aid and security benefits are being offered to third countries. The EP
should use its leverage over trade agreements to this end.
8.1.3 Responding rapidly to disinformation surges
The EU could ring-fence a certain amount of funding for quick release when disinformation campaigns
spike to dangerous levels. This often happens around the time of elections, when long-standing conflicts
flare up, during important international summits or at times of health emergencies. The EU should be able
to provide funds quickly to local actors with a strong presence at community level where the impacts of
disinformation spikes are likely to be most acute.
The EU has admirably supported flexible funding to protect individual human rights defenders when they
face attacks from state authorities. This has been one area in which EU rights policies have grown in
strength over recent years. It could be complemented with funding aimed not so much at individual
activists in danger, but rather at preparing communities to engage in information-related activities around
certain events when societies as a whole will need stronger resilience to combat spikes in disinformation.
8.1.4 Empowering small-scale deliberative forums targeting disinformation
The EU should support participative deliberation initiatives as a means of tackling disinformation. Its
support is beginning to increase for small-scale forums as part of democracy and human rights strategies.
Yet, its approach to disinformation is not linked with such initiatives. The EU should make more effort to
combine these two important strands of its external actions.
Participative deliberation that gives citizens a specific mandate for discussing disinformation could be a
vital and as yet unexplored strand within a more human-rights and empowerment-oriented approach to
this challenge. It should go hand-in-hand with more training for independent community-level journalists
and for political party officials in third countries as they struggle with disinformation in upholding
democratic rights. Participation needs to be part of the way in which disinformation is tackled.
8.1.5 Developing human rights training
In recent years, the EU and other donors have run a large number of programmes to train human rights
and democracy NGOs in digital literary and tech skills. This kind of training will continue to be important.
Conversely there has been a significant absence of training tech-oriented communities in wider issues of
democracy and human rights. There are huge numbers of civil society initiatives around the world now run
by tech experts and focused on very technical aspects of content control and the like. Often these ‘tech
NGOs’ are disconnected from the human rights community and commonly admit that they engage little
The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world
49
on the question of how their tech work relates to democratic quality and rights issues. The EU could make
an express and concerted attempt to correct this imbalance. The need today is not so much to have even
more standard tech training, but rather for increased capacity-building on the nexus between tech and
democracy.
8.2 Global dialogue
EU policymakers recognise the need to do more at global level to tackle these challenges and are open to
building on the approaches they have begun to develop in recent years. Yet they stress that this will need
a deeper shift to complement regulation-based initiatives with rights-based thinking on disinformation.
The EP in particular should promote a broad global forum among democracies, specifically aimed at
ensuring that as new regulations, laws and standards regarding online content move forward, these are
accompanied with additional efforts to strengthen democratic capacity over disinformation in third
countries. Crucially, this forum for global dialogue would specifically and operationally focus on human
rights and democracy concerns. The EP could be a lead sponsor in this regard, helping to raise its profile
specifically on the human rights dimension of counter-disinformation. The EP should also make use of
parliamentary diplomacy tools to create a best practices forum among legislatures. These efforts should
be dovetailed into the civil society roadmaps (and other tools outlined previously) that would bring civil
actors into exchanges with parliamentarians.
In conclusion: these ideas would help shift disinformation from a stand-alone policy area to becoming a
core strand of the EU’s external human rights and democracy policies. While the EU has made significant
steps forward in efforts to limit disinformation, there is still room to give greater prominence to its rights-
oriented dimension. While the challenges are severe, the EU can draw from many encouraging best
practices which are now taking shape across the world. A fully developed human rights approach would
imply that rights do not simply need to be protected online from overly draconian counter-disinformation
measures, but rather be perceived as a more positive imperative in combatting disinformation. It would
move from a defensive position to an empowerment-oriented, proactive stance on the relationship
between disinformation and external human rights support. By offering third countries greater assistance
in human rights protection, the EU would thereby also deliver a tremendous increase in their resilience to
disinformation.
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
50
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